THE FOUNDATION OF ATATURKIST THOUGHT: Secularism

I. MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE OTTOMAN THEOCRACY

One of the main pillars of the political philosophy that gave life to the Republic of Turkey is undoubtedly secularism.

Republican cadres, who had undertaken the mission of creating a modern nation-state from a theocratic and multinational medieval empire, naturally had to reject the traditional state philosophy that sustained the Ottoman system.

What was the structure of the Ottoman order?

Ottoman civilization consisted of a combination of Turkish, Persian and Arab cultures. The religion of Islam provided the moral and social values ​​of this combination and the rules guiding daily life. Even the sultans had to obey the religious provisions while exercising their right to make laws (customary law). This necessity increased as the worldly authority of the Sultans decreased.

Starting from the 16th century, Ottoman social life was opened to the influence of western civilization as well as the influence of eastern civilizations. However, this complex composition, which reflects a wide variety of influences, failed to show the ability to adapt and change in the face of changing world conditions and left its place to more modern national structures.

The complex structure that made up the Ottoman Empire had lost the dynamism that would allow a contemporary social and economic institutionalization in the 19th century. The most important reason for this decline was that the Ottoman order was based on a value system that regarded stability as a virtue rather than changing it. The essence of this value system was the religion of Islam and the rules attributed to it. Like all monotheistic religions, the religion of Islam was divine in origin. Therefore, the rules and principles were powered by the command of God.

If the legal system, state and social management philosophy in a society is based on religion, in other words, on divine orders and rules, it is not possible to deviate from these rules and orders in political or social life, and to make changes on them. As in every theocracy, the basic philosophy of the Ottoman society and state order, which aimed to establish and maintain the divine order, was also closed to discussion and change. Therefore, religion has been both the creator and the guarantor of a stable, change-resistant society. From another point of view, a philosophy of life and administration, legitimized by religion and based on God, did not leave much room for human will in the direction of society. how society will be governed; according to which values ​​the person will direct his behavior; individuals,

As a result, human will was subordinated to forces outside itself or to persons and organizations believed to represent them on earth. Therefore, as in every case where religion dominated social and political life, a regime of freedoms that could be shaped by the participation and preferences of the people did not emerge in the Ottoman system. A democratic, liberal society that is open to scientific creativity could not be established.

However, in the second half of the 19th century, the Western world, which had left behind the Renaissance, Reform and Age of Enlightenment, had reached the stage of the Industrial Revolution. The victory of the human mind and free will in rationalism, scientific creativity, secular social life and moral understanding, participatory democracy, that is, in thought and administration. Western societies had significantly surpassed dogmatic thinking, a static understanding of social order, and a political tradition that excluded the participation of governments. This atmosphere of freedom gave them great dynamism and removed the traditional barriers to their development.

The Ottoman Empire, which was left out of the industrial revolution, could not meet the demands of the 20th century, partly because it could not keep up with these transformations, and partly because its rulers understood the radical changes in the world too hard and too late. With all the contradictions and inadequacies in its structure, it disappeared into history after the First World War. Although they did not share the same historical evolution, Tsarist Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empires, which had similar contradictions, paid the price of not being able to meet the requirements of the industrial age with their traditional and multinational structures by taking their place in the pages of history books.

Many national states filled the vacuum left by the great Ottoman Empire, which spanned three continents. One of them, and of course the most important, is the State of the Republic of Turkey.

Although modern Turkey is the greatest cultural heir to the classical Ottoman civilization, it is a national state that was born in rebellion against its state philosophy. The best way to understand this opposition is to compare these two socio-political systems.

Ottoman rule was a Sultanate. The Sultanate is a monarchy governed by the principles of the Islamic religion. A monarch, that is, a Sultan, is a person who uses the royal rights granted to him by God within the framework of the rules set by religion. As soon as it goes beyond these rules, it loses its ground of legitimacy. Therefore, the Sultan's orders could not conflict with the basic principles of religious law. There was a council of clergy who supervised whether there was such a contradiction in the Ottoman system. Sheikh-ul-Islam and the muftis working under his presidency supervised and interpreted the decisions of the worldly authority in terms of Sharia. Qadis, on the other hand, dispensed justice in accordance with the Shari'ah. Sharia was a legal system based on the Qur'an (God's command), Sunnah (what the Prophet did), and Hadith (what the Prophet said or attributed to him). It was not possible to doubt or change because it was of divine origin. However, in new situations that did not comply with the established rules, new interpretations could be brought with the fatwa to be given by the muftis. Of course, the new interpretations had to be in accordance with the traditional provisions of the Shari'a.

As can be seen, the Shari'a was a set of sacred rules and principles that everyone had to abide by at all times. It included every area and every period of life. Since Islamic philosophy did not distinguish between the religious and the secular, it was not possible for Muslims to act outside the rules of religion.

It was therefore not easy to make changes in social institutions based on religious norms. Just as much difficulty arose in taking the decisions that would keep up with the changes taking place in the world, according to the objective measures of reason and science. Because the Shari'a does not easily allow the separation of thought from belief; He wanted to control thought.

The main task of the State, which was established according to Islamic principles, did not end with the functioning of religion as a system of belief, worship and morality, it included the implementation and implementation of it as a legal system and behavior pattern. It can be seen that the Ottoman Empire was religious and theocratic both in theory and in practice.

Ottoman religious law, based on Sharia, differs from the modern legal system, which is called the "positive law" system, which is also adopted by Turkey today, in two respects. It is once holistic. It wants to control and regulate all areas of life. While the positive legal system aims to regulate people's relations with other people and the state, Shariah is not content with it. Apart from these areas, it also aims to regulate the relations between the conscience of the person and the "sacred-divine" area. In other words, beyond specifying what the individual is authorized and obliged to do; conscientiously imposes on what to do and what not to do. In this sense, Shariah assumes the role of supervisor and director of all private and social feelings, thoughts and actions of the individual, both as a measure of conscience and as a legal system.

In this framework, the individual does not have the opportunity to think, hear and act outside the rules and principles of religion. Therefore, the field of thought cannot be separated from belief, cannot come out of its patterns. In other words, thought cannot diversify and develop because it cannot be liberated from dogma.

On the other hand, it is not possible for an individual, whose every action is subject to the binding decisions of the religious state, to have the freedom of action to change and correct the established order. Individuals cannot suggest remedies to improve their society and cannot put their suggestions into practice. As a matter of fact, many Viziers, Grand Viziers and two Sultans who tried to make radical reforms during the Ottoman period were beheaded, and there were rebellions against many of them. In the leading role of the said revolts, "clergy" who were generally against the change of order were seen.

Let's take this assessment one step further: If we assume that the legitimacy of those who undertake the administration of society is derived from religion, and that the legal system they implement is based on immutable, unalterable divine provisions, it is difficult to find an understanding of citizenship based on equality and fundamental rights in such a system. There is only servitude. As a matter of fact, everyone in the Ottoman society, even the chief vizier, is a servant. A servant is a passive person who obeys orders and fulfills them. They have no rights; It has obligations and blessings. Political participation, pluralistic administration and democracy in a society made up of servants are dreams that cannot even be mentioned. They are dangerous concepts to even say. Because each of them puts human will before religious rules.

To summarize, two objectionable effects of a "Religious State" on social life can be mentioned:

1) The inability of thought to be independent of belief.

2) Inability of the individual to create a unique non-religious field of action and thought that becomes independent from the holistic (totalist) and authoritarian state.

The combined effect of both inconveniences condemned the Ottoman Empire, which was a vast empire of the world, to a stagnation that decayed from within and a weakness that succumbed to the pressures of modern societies from the outside.

The inability of thought to be independent of belief means that the metaphysical worldview, bigotry, and science are prevented from developing. Indeed, the objective way of thinking could not gain an independent existence of its own because religion tightly controlled all spheres of life. Therefore, Ottoman society could never experience a "Renaissance" and "Age of Enlightenment". The positive sciences did not develop. Therefore, it lost its once irresistible military power in the face of increasingly scientific warfare and weapon technology.

Where science does not develop, technology, which is its product, cannot develop. As a matter of fact, traditional Ottoman handicrafts started to collapse from the 16th century and the country's economy gained the appearance of a colonial economy in the second half of the 19th century.

In the face of this widespread collapse, perhaps a solution could be found in a pluralistic form of government that allowed the participation of the people. However, since the Ottoman monarchical theocracy used sovereignty in the name of Allah, it was not willing to share it with the "people" in any way.

In theocracies, sovereignty belongs to God, and either a dynasty or clergy or together reigns in his name. They follow the divine commands and check whether they are followed.

Therefore, the rulers and the clergy who helped them do their best to keep the theocratic order intact and to preserve their privileged position even if their country remained in the darkness of the Middle Ages. We can see the same resistance in the Ottoman example.

For this reason, the cadres who founded the Republic of Turkey based the philosophical basis of the modern society they tried to create on secularism and the form of government on representative democracy.

What was the secularism understanding of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who founded the Republic, and his idealist friends?

II. THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY'S LOCALITY UNDERSTANDING

Secularism, first of all, requires the existence of a natural moral system independent of religion or religions adopted by the members of the society. What determines the principles of such a moral system is not a transcendent power or a supra-social authority, but a community of individuals determined to implement it. It is impossible to talk about the coercion of a moral system of this nature. Because it is based on moral rules and legal order that individuals who desire to live together create with their own will. It is “natural” and reasonable because it arises from voluntary choice and current needs.

Such an understanding of secularism is based on freedom of thought and the right of individuals to differ in their views. In addition, secularism defends the right to discuss everything material and sacred, the immortality of the soul, conscientious choices, and all questions of moral responsibility.

In addition, the understanding of secularism adopts the view that justice and salvation are possible not only after death and in the next world, but also while living and in this world.

On the other hand, secularism adopts rational research. He is against accepting his dogmas simply because they are "sacred". He advocates examining the universe with scientific methods and making constant efforts to explain it with reason.

In short, secularism is against theological and metaphysical absolutes. It shows the same opposition to social institutions, practices and political ideologies, which are claimed to be unchangeable and unchangeable, but which only serve to camouflage certain interests.

Instead of waiting for social justice, happiness and well-being to happen after death; Laicism, which proposes to realize them while living in this world, takes its power from the objective and effective methods of science. Therefore, secularism is not emotional, but objectivity; universality, not arbitrariness; to understand the whole, not the partial; It adopts the principle of achievement, not privilege (privilege). Because only on the basis of these principles can one get rid of metaphysics, locality, backwardness and the worship of authority.

The founders of the Republic were undoubtedly people of faith. They were devoted to their religion. But they understood that being religious was very different from understanding and arranging the universe and life according to religious principles. While they are directing the world and worldly life of thought and science, which is its most "true master"; they believed that religion should also regulate the relations of man with the "sacred space" in the belief system he adopted. Thus, the earthly realm and the divine realm would be made independent of each other. They would be freed from each other's interference and pressure.

Indeed, the great Atatürk and his friends implemented a philosophy of life, the importance of which was perhaps not well understood at that time, but which is very meaningful and appropriate for us today.

By separating the realms of thought and action from the realm of belief, they were not trying to prevent one of them from dominating the other, namely religion, social and political institutions. They also prevented the political authority from disrespecting people's religious creeds and freedom of worship with the intention of rejecting religion and denying freedom of belief.

The Republican administration rejected bigotry. He rejected bigotry, people should be free in their beliefs. The measure of this freedom was the right of individuals and groups to hold different beliefs. However, respect for differences could reduce the phenomenon of freedom from ideal to practical. Thus, the purpose of secularism was to set people free in their beliefs by establishing respect for differences.

In fact, bigotry, which limits belief, puts both thought and action. Bigotry is the nature of prohibitive minds and governments. They try to impose their private views and beliefs on others. However, coercion is the end of freedoms, no matter who or what "sublime" authority is made. Atatürk understood the following equation very well: Absolute thought is the child of absolute governments. Taboos, dogmas, prohibitions of thought and initiative live in the bosom of arbitrary bigoted and tyrannical governments. Neither individuals nor the state should perpetrate this tyranny. Starting from this view, the young Republic of Turkey wanted to prevent religion from controlling political-social life, as well as preventing the majority from dominating different views and belief groups.

Atatürk and the Republican cadres were against the politicization of religion, but they understood the importance of its spiritual and moral function. Therefore, they tried to translate the language of worship into Turkish so that the Turks could understand their religion, and they took the lead in the translation of the Qur'an. Because they knew that a society that could not understand its religion would believe in superstitions and would remain alien to its essence. This alienation will gradually turn into formalism and take on an artificial asceticism based on the interpretations of the intermediaries. However, the aim of religious education is not to bow down in fear of the unknown, but to believe knowingly and to have faith.

Sensing the danger in this area well, the Republican administration wanted to save the religious institution from formalism and centralism, as well as a series of deep-rooted social and cultural reforms. First, he abolished the religious bureaucracy (ulema), which was the main pillar of the Ottoman theocracy. An intermediary position between the believer and his God did not allow an official authority to remain. Believers would have unlimited freedom in their beliefs and worship. It could be the religion of individuals or even societies, but for the founders of the Republic, it could not be the religion of the state. Why?

First of all, the state is an abstract concept. It is the general composition of the institutions created by the nation to govern itself and to meet its basic needs. It is an institutional structure. Institutions cannot have religion. People have clusters. On the other hand, the state was created to serve people and society. People and groups of different religions live between the wings of a national state. If the state has an official religion, it will not be possible to be impartial and treat them equally. However, the state was established to serve individuals and society on an equal level, without taking sides. A state that loses its impartiality also loses its legitimacy and unifying power. National unity is damaged, social solidarity is dissolved.

Moreover, the state's official refusal to adopt a particular religion provides freedom and assurance of belief to citizens and groups who have different beliefs from those who govern, in their adherence to their own religious creed. Such an attitude is also a requirement of the understanding of the democratic state. Because, in the tradition of a democratic state, religious beliefs are protected from their arbitrariness, bigotry and intolerance, as well as freedom from religious pressure on individuals, society and the state.

It seems that the principle of "people and communities have religion, not the state", adopted by the young Republican regime, would both remove the metaphysical obstacles to creating a modern society. It would also establish a democratic, participatory state model based on people's self-government. Sovereignty would no longer be based on a metaphysical source, and that source could not be exercised by proxy by persons and groups not chosen by the people. Sovereignty right was to be exercised by individuals with “free mind and conscience” chosen by their common will, by the methods they determined, and by the institutions they created. This political philosophy adopted by the Young Turkish Republic was embodied in the following saying: “Sovereignty belongs to the nation unconditionally”.

III. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE SEcular REPUBLIC

The first practice of the Republican administration, which was determined to make the secular world view valid in every aspect of the social, political and cultural life of the Turkish society, was to abolish the tutelage of the religious organization over the state organization and its political functions. The religious organization network, which was first called the Ministry of Foundations and Seriye, was abolished. Then the three main sources that ensured the independence and power of the religious bureaucracy called the ulema were eliminated.

These were, in order:

1) Institution of Fatwa:

A wing of the ulema oversees the application of religious law, called the Shari'a; He interpreted the facts of daily life with the decisions called “Fatwa”. With this function, it had control over all the decisions taken by the Sultan and the bureaucracy of the sultanate. In other words, the ulema were a pressure group that had the last word on worldly authority with the religious authority they held. Every innovative administration had to carry out the reforms required by the age against such a strong resistance. By the 17th century, the issue had transcended power-sharing. When the age of powerful Sultans who could control the ulema was over, and the age of the weak Sultans who could control came to an end, the weakened worldly authority became unable to use its administrative authority without the approval of the clergy. The conflict of authority between the ulema and the worldly authority represented by the Sultanate took the appearance of a bloody struggle from time to time. After the 17th century, the Sultan's freedom of action outside the Shari'a was severely limited.

2) Economic Independence:

Most of the personnel and current expenses of the religious authority were met by the income of self-sufficient enterprises or income-generating properties, which were collected under the name of “foundations”. Since they were religious donations, the state could not interfere with foundations. As long as the income provided was used in line with the purpose of the foundation, the foundation was operated independently of the state by the donor, family or its own board of trustees. This independent source of income made the Ulama both economically strong and provided them with income outside the state budget. Not being financially subject to the control of the central authority granted the religious cadres a strategic autonomy for the state.

3) Judicial and Educational Functions:

A third reason that made the ulama powerful was that they performed judicial and educational functions. Justice was distributed through the ulema called the Qadi. Both the judgeship and the prosecutor's office were gathered in the office of kadi. The first and last word in the judiciary belonged to the kadi.

Since the Ottoman education system was based on religion, it was based on the teaching of clergy, that is, professors, from primary school to the Madrasa, which was the higher education institution at that time. As long as they held the judicial and educational functions, the ulama not only had a very active role in social life, but also had the opportunity to legally consolidate the system they dominated and to raise people who would adopt it.

The progressive and innovative cadres of the Young Republic knew that they could not modernize traditional society without breaking the influence of the Ulema. In addition, they wanted to create a solidary and homogeneous national state with national unity from the heterogeneous structure of a cosmopolitan empire. Therefore, they were in favor of a united nation, a single-headed government, and a monolithic dominant ideology. They were not in favor of sharing their political power with any group or authority. The republican administration recognized a single authority, a single source of legitimacy: the will of the nation itself; desire for self-management. The ideological expression of this will is “nationalism”.

The final political regime that nationalism can adopt is republic and representative government.

A nation that can govern itself through elected representatives does not need any other source of legitimacy other than the national will. Every nation, every government that does not seek a will other than its own free will as a source of legitimacy, is inevitably secular. It was not possible for the secular Turkish Republic Government to share its political power with a cadre (i.e. Ulema) who adopted a metaphysical will as a source of sovereignty instead of the will of the people. As a matter of fact, this contradiction was resolved with the abolition of the Ministry of Foundations and Seriye, with the proclamation of the Republic. The ulema went down in history along with the other ruling sections of the Ottoman society.

In this sense, the proclamation of the Republic is a political revolution. Because not only all executive sections have changed; Along with them, the value system that kept the Ottoman ruling strata in power was removed from Turkey's cultural repertoire.

A glance at the traditional political structure transformed by the republic reveals the multiplicity of the revolution achieved:

The ruling cadres of the Ottoman administration, starting with the Sultan and the Dynasty, consisted of appointed military and civilian bureaucrats. The ulema also formed a wing of the civil bureaucracy. The source of legitimacy that sustained this political structure was religion. The Sultan ruled in the name of God, and everyone else was subject to his divine origin power, which also came from his being Caliph.

The members of the society were not citizens with equal rights, but servants who were unequally ranked with the rights and responsibilities bestowed upon them. The status of each individual was determined by the status of the religious group - the nation - to which he belonged.

During the Ottoman period, Muslims were in a superior position. When the empire weakened, the minorities, who strengthened their economic and social status under the patronage of the rising and stronger Western Christian states, gained more privileges than the Muslims in time.

The Republican administration closed the period of servitude by overthrowing the Ottoman theocratic structure, which based the status of individuals and social groups on their religious affiliation. In the new history page that has been opened, religion has taken its real and respected place in the individual (conscientious) and cultural sphere occupied by belief systems in all modern societies, leaving the political sphere into which it was drawn for various historical reasons. Thus, thought (science) and action (politics) were separated from faith. Each had the opportunity to develop freely and be protected by law from the interference of one another. With the phenomenon of equality provided by secular laws, the period of citizenship began.

IV. LEGAL REGULATIONS

The first stage of the political revolution that took place with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey was the abolition of the religious, administrative and military bureaucracy on which the Ottoman dynasty and the monarchical system symbolized by this dynasty were based. However, these were only cadres of the Ottoman administration. It would not have been possible to purify the national state from the spirit of Ottomanism without destroying the values ​​and legal system that gave those cadres the right to rule.

The origin of the value system that legitimizes the Ottoman order was Sharia. Sharia order constituted the legal basis of a monarchical political structure in accordance with religious principles and rules. In a multi-religious social system, it is possible to make a legal system based on the provisions of a single religion dominant only if the central authority, that is, the state, is very strong. While the Ottoman state was strong, it was not a problem to apply the Islamic legal order based on Sharia and customary laws throughout the country without much objection. In fact, the religious clusters that formed the Ottoman mosaic had a highly autonomous legal status called the "millet" system. In each religious cluster, legal problems were resolved in accordance with the established rules and traditions of the community. Sharia was valid only between Muslims and in legal relations between a Muslim and a non-Muslim.

As the empire weakened and the central government lost its influence over the non-Muslims, each of whom found a Western patron, it encountered great resistance in resolving legal disputes between a Muslim Ottoman and a non-Muslim Ottoman or foreigner on the basis of Sharia. Since the second half of the 19th century, many secular legal arrangements in line with the requirements of the age in the Ottoman legal order are not a coincidence, but the inevitable result of this situation.

The main reasons for this necessity are as follows: Ottoman society is regressing in the face of the West, which has completed the industrial revolution and is getting stronger. But on the other hand, it is connected to the world market with its economy. In addition, it needs a more universal legal system under the pressure of strengthening nationalist movements. In the face of all these demands, the Ottoman Empire could not avoid the necessity of modernizing, universalizing and secularizing its laws by separating them from Islamic law.

It is seen that the phenomenon of the secularization of the law, which came to its natural conclusion with the Republic, started in the Ottoman period with the effect of nationalism movements, as well as the weakening of the central government. From this point of view, Turkish nationalism is just one of the other nationalist movements that rebelled against the Ottoman theocratic order.

The nationalist movement that created the Turkish Republic gave its real name to the national state it founded fourteen years later. With a constitutional amendment made in 1937, the Turkish state gained its secular title.

This brave and modern decision symbolizes that the great leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his ideal friends have completed the political revolution they started. Every political revolution brings with it a value system that will legitimize itself. He has to bring it. As a matter of fact, in the ideological plan, the Republican administration has worked on the principles of "nationalism" and "populism". On the legal plane, all laws are secularized.

While the state was secularized and placed in a supra-religious position, the freedom of belief and worship of socio-ethnic groups and individuals was not limited. Freedom of belief is considered one of the most natural social rights of individuals. The protection of this right is given to the secular state and its related institutions, which do not take sides between various beliefs and religions.

The principle of secularism, which has become a constitutional provision, has also been supported by the provisions of the newly adopted laws. For example, according to the Law on Associations, establishing associations "based on sect and sect" is prohibited. Political parties and associations especially seeking religious support and making religious propaganda are also prohibited by law. The Penal Code, on the other hand, made it a crime to attack the Republican administration and its legal system based on religion.

The revolutionary cadres of the Republic, who wanted to establish the modern society they desired as soon as possible, believed that it was necessary to enact all laws in a short time by arranging the social life.

The legal revolution was started in 1925 with Atatürk's words, “We are attempting to uproot the old legal principles by creating completely new laws”. More precisely, the legal reforms undertaken in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, piecemeal and devoid of a basic philosophy, have reached their natural and definitive result.

First, the field of civil law, which is the basis of a legal system, was dealt with. It was attempted to regulate the principles regarding the rights and responsibilities (obligations) of the individual entering the field of civil law, the establishment of the family, its functioning, termination, inheritance, property and debts. However, when it was understood that it would take a long time to prepare a new and brand new civil code, a different method was followed.

The Young Republic had no time. The legal arrangement that would symbolize the transition of the Turkish nation from being a citizen to a citizen and bring it to the "level of modern civilization" had to be made as soon as possible. In addition, such a deep-rooted and comprehensive undertaking required expertise. The Republic's deficit in this area was large. A bold decision was then made. The main civil laws in force in the western world were examined. Among them, the Swiss Civil Code, which was the best, most modern and most suitable for the social and cultural goals Turkey wanted to reach, was adopted with some changes. As the saying goes, "inoculation" was made from a secular legal order.

The Turkish Civil Code and Code of Obligations, which came into force after being passed in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1926, offered the Turkish nation the opportunity of a modern legal system and social life order. For example, with this Law, legal equality between men and women was achieved that did not exist before. Women gained the right to enter any business and profession. The unequal status of women in the fields of family and inheritance was ended; The traditional privileges of men gave way to equality between the sexes. The practice of civil marriage reinforced this equality.

Provisions of property law pertaining to natural and legal persons brought innovations needed by modern Turkey.

Again, the Turkish Penal Code, which entered into force in 1926, was prepared in accordance with the example of the Italian Penal Code of 1889.

The Code of Civil Procedure, which came into force in 1927, is a transliterated version of the Law of the same name adopted in 1925 in the Swiss Canton of NeuChatel.

Criminal Procedure Code, which came into force in 1929

Inherited from the German example of 1877.

The Commercial Code put into effect in 1926, for the example of Switzerland; The provisions regarding maritime trade were prepared in accordance with the German Maritime Trade Law.

The main source of administrative law was the French legislation on which our system of government was intended to be based.

After years of common sense practices, this legal "vaccination" gained a national character after a while.

In 1930, Turkish women were elected to the municipal elections; With a constitutional amendment made in 1934, the right to participate in general elections and to be elected as a deputy was given. In the general elections held in 1935, Turkish women entered the Parliament earlier than in Switzerland, where the Civil Code was taken.

The legal accumulation in the field of equality between women and men has allowed women to take part in all professions today, and even to enter military schools and the army.

Basic laws such as the Secular Civil Code, the Commercial Code, and the Penal Code were excluded from the functioning of religious, social, political, economic and judicial institutions the moment they were adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; It has been placed where it should be, in its respected position in the field of belief. Thus, it was aimed to prevent religion from being worn down by political conflicts and ideological interpretations.

The Republican administration saw the backwardness of the society in its traditional social and cultural institutions, and wanted to destroy the legal system and even cultural symbols that kept them alive with these institutions. In other words, the Republic aimed to break the bridges with its past, which represented another era.

In line with this goal, the Caliphate was abolished on March 3, 1924 by Law No. 431. The first article of the “Law on the Abolition of the Caliphate and the Expulsion of the Ottoman Dynasty from the Civil Service of the Republic of Turkey” definitively diverted the source of sovereignty, with the provision that "Since the caliphate is essentially inherent in the meaning and concept of the government and the republic, the seat of the caliphate is abolished". All official institutions dealing with religious affairs following the caliphate were abolished. The Presidency of Religious Affairs was established and religious services began to be performed through this institution. Schools were attached to the Ministry of National Education as secular education institutions. Religious education was brought under state control. The tithe, a tax of religious origin, was abolished. Modern taxation procedures were adopted. All independent unofficial religious establishments, i.e. lodges, zawiyas, sect houses were closed. The religious-based calendar gave way to the universal calendar. Switched to the metric system. With the hat and dress code, all types of headgear – such as fez and turban – and dresses, which symbolize Ottoman social life and tradition, gave way to modern clothes.

These laws and the seriousness of enforcing them astonish Westerners even today. However, it is necessary to understand the revolutionary cadres of the Republic, who adopted the desire to bring their country to modern civilization as a vital mission, and the feelings of the great innovator Atatürk in this field. They are the fez of the backward "East"; they saw the turban as a symbol of the reactionary head. In order to modernize and westernize, they wanted to erase all the symbols of an era and mentality they wanted to leave behind from social life. After all, a person's clothing is an indicator of his cultural accumulation. The target of Republican Turkey is the level of development that Western societies have reached. While they wanted to reach this stage in science and art, they understood that this could not be done with fez, turban, chador and veil. Therefore, the leap in the field of science and art, which is a difficult process,

The legal and cultural reforms to keep the secular republic alive were giant steps on the road to modern Turkey. However, they could not achieve their goals without fundamental changes in the administrative field.

V. SECULARIZATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The biggest change made in the administrative field is undoubtedly the separation of the presidency from the religious imamate, that is, the leadership of the religious community. While the republican cadre abolished the Sultanate (Sultanate) office, it also isolated the Caliphate from its administrative and political powers. Since the republican regime could not be compatible with an autocratic-despotic presidency, the Ottoman sultanate was abolished together with the Sultanate that symbolized it.

It was not possible for an absolutist monarchy to survive in the age of mass participation or participatory parliamentary politics. Perhaps the existence of the Caliph as the international imam of the Muslim community could theoretically be sustained. But various factors prevented this from happening.

There are several important historical reasons for the abolition of the caliphate:

1) When the First World War was entered, only lands belonging to Muslims remained in the hands of the Ottoman Empire. "Non-Muslim nations" had declared their independence in the regions where they formed the majority. Even bordering former Ottoman subjects, Balkan Nations, entered the war against the Ottoman Empire, and were severely battered in the First and Second Balkan Wars.

After the Turks, the most populous subjects of the Ottoman Empire were Arabs. Both the Palace and the Turkish Nation, relying on the unity of heart and belief brought about by being a Muslim, i. In World War II, they expected the Arabs to fight alongside the Turks against the Ottoman Empire's enemies. The Arabs, however, showed that they preferred their independence to religion and Ottoman unity by siding with the British, who promised them independence in the First World War, even though their Caliphs called them to "Jihad". As a result of this behavior, which was seen as "betrayal" to religion and the state at that time, the Ottoman Empire later regressed to the national borders determined by the National Pact. Thus, it was understood that the Caliph did not have any sanction power on Muslims other than Turks.

2) With the proclamation of the Republic, the Presidency became a secular and popular national leadership institution to be determined by the free will of the people.

Regardless of the individual characteristics and abilities of the person who filled it, the possibility of using this office solely on the basis of divine and familial rights, that is, in accordance with tradition, disappeared. The head of the republican regime was the person elected by the people, believing that he would best meet the needs of the society and the requirements of the office he occupied. Such a position and personality are in stark contrast to the concept and institution of the Sultanate or Sultanate. However, the secular Presidency and the Khilafah institution, which was isolated from all political qualifications, rights and activities, could have lived side by side (in the form of cohabitation). This would only be possible if the following conditions were met:

a) The Turkish Grand National Assembly, the legislative body of the Young Republic, would elect the Caliph and supervise his actions. Therefore, the Caliph would be responsible to the people.

b) Even if the Caliph, like Abdulmecid Efendi, the first and only Caliph elected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, came from an Ottoman family, he would represent the religious authority he assumed, not this family. Its power would be of a spiritual rather than a political nature.

3) Another application area of ​​politics is in foreign policy. The Republican Government, which had gained its national independence by giving a War of Independence, was under the suspicion that the independent movements of the Caliph would lead to a two-headed administration in foreign policy. There was enough evidence for that. Except for Afghanistan, Muslim countries, all of which had colonial status, equated Turkey, which had achieved its national liberation, with the institution of the Khilafah. Based on the material and moral support of the Caliph, they wanted to get rid of colonialism with a similar struggle. The intention was good, but there were serious practical problems that this expectation would cause for the young Republic administration.

First of all, there was no second country that lost in the First World War and signed a peace treaty on its own terms as a result of its honorable struggle. This result was a formidable victory over the victors of World War II, won with great sacrifice. States such as England and France, each of which was the colonial empire of the time, were extremely sensitive to the relations that would raise the Muslim communities under their rule. If the Caliphate would support the struggle of the Muslim peoples against these states and endanger their empire, it would invite a formidable counter-reaction. Moreover, this reaction would not only be against the Caliph and the Caliphate, but also against the Republican regime that sheltered him. The Republic and independent state, which was established with so much life, blood and sacrifice, would be endangered by these two-headed foreign policy dilemmas. As a matter of fact, all these drawbacks started to show themselves during the short caliphate of Abdulmecid Efendi.

The Republican Government saw the caliphate as an institution elected through the representatives of the people and responsible to the people. Therefore, he considered the Caliphate's budget as a part of the general public finances. But Caliph Abdülmecid Efendi demanded an independent budget of his own. When this demand was combined with practices such as sending representatives to foreign countries, accepting foreign ambassadors without consulting the Government, and holding grandiose sultanate ceremonies, the Government of the Republic showed the expected reaction. A government within a government could not have more than one Head of State.

On the other hand, the caliphate was becoming the common symbol of the return aspirations of the traditional segments who yearned for the old period. Evaluating all these drawbacks, the office of the Caliphate was removed from the front of secular development with a radical decision. On March 10.24, the Caliphate was abolished. Caliph Abdülmecid Efendi was expelled from the borders of the country along with all the members of the sultanate family remaining in Turkey.

Thus, the political and legal bond between the young Turkish Republic and the Ottoman past was definitively and radically severed. The remaining bond is social and cultural. The six-century-old Ottoman tree gave life to its last sapling and was withdrawn from the stage of history. This fresh sapling has been nourished by the secular and democratic republican regime, which is its essence, and has flourished as this national state.

Today, every Turk knows that modern democracy is based on the principle of "separation of powers". “Union of forces” is a feature of totalitarian governments. Theocracy is a form of totalitarianism. Just like communism and fascism, what is criticized by individuals is the most uncontrollable, authoritarian and prohibitive; therefore, it is a form of management that is closed to different views and demands.

All of the Republican revolutions have been practices that have implemented or aimed to implement the understanding of secularism, which is at the core of the regime. So, has this goal been achieved?

VI. Secularism and its structural limits

If the political revolution that prepared the foundation of the republic and the cultural reforms made to keep it alive could be supported by a radical economic transformation, this question could be answered "yes" without hesitation. However, the Ottoman Empire, which experienced a long period of collapse, left a very poor economy to the Republic of Turkey. Moreover, in the autumn of 1922, the Turks, who had to fight with the Westerners, who tried to share Ottoman property for another three years after the Balkan and First World Wars, inherited a country in ruins, a bankrupt economy, and a tired people. The "Ottoman debts" were put on the shoulders of the people, most of whom lived in poverty in the villages and outside the market economy, by the victors of the First World War. The young Turkish Republic paid the debts to the Ottoman Empire as a state debt until 1956.

In the face of these adverse conditions, it was impossible for Turkey to realize a large-scale economic transformation with its own scarce capital and trained human resources, in the environment of the 1929 world financial crisis that entered shortly after. If this transformation were possible, the country's economy would soon get rid of its stagnant and local (local) character, and the surplus capital obtained from the commercialized agricultural sector would be transferred to industry. The industrial labor demand, which increased with the growth of industry, would be met by the surplus population, which became unnecessary for the commercialized agricultural economy and had to leave the land. Industrial and commercial enterprises, generally concentrated in urban areas, would accelerate urbanization with the workforce they attracted and cities would grow at an increasing rate.

All this has been said to some extent. But it didn't happen in 20-30 years, like for example Japan or South Korea. It happened much more slowly and unevenly. The agricultural economy achieved the desired dynamism only in the 1960s. Small property order and semi-feudal landlordism in Eastern Anatolia prevented the efficient operation of agricultural enterprises and rapid capital accumulation. While excessive division by inheritance made agricultural enterprises smaller and unproductive, low-income producers were unable to increase their purchasing power, which would expand the industrial goods market. Industrial development was limited. Rather, the industry appealed to the domestic market within the framework of import substitution.

The limited structure of the industry that developed in the cities could not ensure that the rural-urban population distribution was balanced and massively deteriorated in favor of the cities. It was only in 1985 that the urban population surpassed the rural population for the first time. A large part of the country's population continued to live in the countryside, where the traditional way of life prevailed.

While rapidly developing cities were the scene of a modern social lifestyle, large sections of population living in villages and towns stuck in traditional values ​​and habits remained on the edge of modernization. The improvement and change in village life was only a partial reflection of that in the cities.

However, the phenomenon of commercialization of agriculture, which started in the 1950s, opened the traditional structure of the countryside to the influence of the market economy. The local authorities, which were dominant in the countryside, started to give way to more rational labor-capital relations, the relations contrary to the liberal economic rules, that is, to productivity. On the one hand, businesses that abandoned the vicious cycle of satiation production and started production for the market pushed the unnecessary surplus out of agriculture. On the other hand, as agricultural holdings, most of which were already small, were further divided and inefficient due to inheritance, a portion of the rural population had to seek their life chances outside of the agricultural economy.

The said surplus population responded to the labor demand that emerged in the service, trade and industry branches of the developing and growing cities. Migration that started in the 1950s continues today. In fact, the only target of population sections leaving the villages is not the metropolises, but the international industrial and commercial centers.

The phenomenon of migration and its natural result, urbanization, are of great importance in terms of social change. First, it removes the centuries-old traditional, stagnant and social control of large sections of the population from an extremely tight community fabric. Within the cosmopolitan, loosely woven social relations of the cities, the new urban families are more lonely but much more free. Then, they are under the "cross-pressure" of many emotional, intellectual, social and cultural influences within the modern life style of cities. In the face of these multifaceted effects, stereotyped thoughts and habits, traditional skills are not enough to direct people's lives.

Traditions are replaced by more rational and contemporary knowledge and skills. Individuals who gain the new knowledge and skills mentioned, tend to a worldview other than the static and traditional patterns of rural life.

The population segments whose lives are modernized in the material field, modernized in the field of thought and distanced from the traditions inevitably approach the secular world view. Traditions gradually lose their influence, both with the general development of the country and with the modern lifestyle of some population segments.

The most rooted tradition is religious beliefs and practices. Therefore, in the modernizing lifestyle, religion gradually loses its quality as a system of thought and principle that regulates the practice of daily life. On the other hand, it preserves its sacred place in the spiritual realm. To the extent that it constitutes the field of belief that directs the individual's relations with the "sacred", religion is freed from the changing interpretations and effects of politics.

However, a distinction must be made between secularism and secularization. Secularism is a policy. Secularization is the realization of this policy as a sociological process. As Turkish society modernized, the principle (secularism) adopted as a state policy by the cadres who founded the Republic would find its institutional basis in social life. Thus, a policy choice would have turned into a political principle, a social phenomenon. At this stage, there would be no need for secularism to be realized and protected by the power of the state. Important sections of the population would begin to see secular thought, secular law, secular administration, and secular education as a necessity and an integral part of their daily lives.

However, nothing is monotonous and one-sided on the sociological plane. Social change and economic development provide many people and many social groups with a variety of benefits and opportunities. However, many traditional socio-economic categories do not perceive the change in society as positive, even if this social change is in the direction of development. They cannot perceive.

Then, they resist social change and modernization, new patterns of thought and behavior. This resistance sometimes turns into a form of protest symbolized by traditional sections. The content of the protest in question is loaded with the glorification of traditional values ​​and institutions and the condemnation of the modern ones. suspicious of change; They are also rebellious when they perceive it as a threat to their own existence. This attitude makes them conservative, often ultra-conservative.

Generally, all rural population segments that produce satisfactory products for their own consumption; artisans who produce goods and services based on simple tools; Clusters of artisans engaged in small-scale trade and distribution activities by labor-intensive methods constitute the aforementioned traditional economic categories. These social categories, which are the product of a vanishing economic order, cannot find their place in the modernizing, factory-based, high-tech economic organization.

On the one hand, large capital institutions that determine the market conditions, large production units; On the other hand, traditional socio-economic categories, unable to compete with giant workers' organizations that direct labor supply and wages, fear that not only their economic opportunities but also their social assets (functions) are at risk of extinction. They perceive and express this situation as a “crisis”. At the very least, their ideological rhetoric is filled with anxiety about the future.

The most powerful cultural element and central value system of the traditional lifestyle is undoubtedly religion. Therefore, conservative ideologies that condemn modern life are inevitably hostile to secularism.

The traditional protest movement, which is widely observed in the Islamic world today, presents religion (Islam) not only as a field of morality and belief, but as a unified system of life that includes the social organization, management style, law and education system. The "Islamic integrity" thesis does not accept the separation of religious authority from worldly authority. The legitimacy ground of religious authority is ready: the commandment of God. From the same point of view, there is nothing that justifies worldly authority except the tyranny and deception of tyrants.

The defenders of the religious state do not stop with these claims. Nor do they accept the will of the people, which provides legitimacy to the national state. There is only one will for them: the will of God. The only duty of man is to be subject to this will and to attain divine peace. But what is overlooked is that the rules and principles put forward as God's command are separate and contradictory in each sect and religious group. Even among the clergy of the same religion, there are different and contradictory interpretations of what God's commandment is.

If there is only one thing in common, it is the great hostility of those who support a religious society and political organization model to nationalism and democracy. They view both phenomena as insulting religion and betrayal of the order that God has envisioned.

They believe that the following will happen in the social structure shaped by religious rules:

“Believers - believers - do not oppress each other. They persevere in the face of difficulty. Religion does not provide equality in the world, but as long as the small obey and respect the elder; The big guards the small. The annual income distribution ordered by religion prevents absolute poverty. Having consented to his sustenance in this solidaristic order; There is no danger of extinction after being overly ambitious and not breaking the order. Since the social order is established in accordance with divine orders, it is not permissible to change or change it. In this stable socio-economic structure, rights, obligations and social statuses are fixed. As long as it is stable, there is an element of trust; There is no worry of extinction.”

Creating a stable and secure society is a hopeful desire for people who are dragged in front of the great dynamism created by fierce competition, rapid change and development in the world. Even if the price of this is to oppose change and development, to adopt outdated organizational and management models that are no longer possible.

Without an ideology that evokes and defends the aforementioned solidarist and stagnant society, traditional sections cannot bring their aspirations to the political arena. There is already a frame of reference for this: Religious discourse (form of expression)...

Religious discourse, in other words, religious terminology and expression has a history of one thousand four hundred years. There are value judgments, terms, symbolic connotations, common practices -such as worship, zakat, fitra- and a "serial" understanding of law that has been practiced in our past and turned into habits. This very understandable, very "familiar" frame of reference is part of a familiar "familiar" world to many. It is not foreign at all. Since it is not a foreigner and it constitutes an important part of cultural accumulation, it is always a source of evaluation and discourse, the carrier of a safe lifestyle proposal to take refuge in every crisis.

Indeed, the traditional segments, regressing in the face of modernization and westernization and concerned about their existence, see a lifestyle and society model that is closer to them in religious discourse: stagnant, secure, fair, closed to the cultural influences of the West that they call "destructive" and "destructive". the one which; therefore, a model of society that does not aim to change established values ​​and statuses...

If one element of this new but retrospective, nostalgic worldview is the revival of traditional society, the other is the reaction to modernization and westernization. Because modernization and westernization involve a radical change in structure. In this great change process, while many people's life opportunities have increased, the traditional balances that others have established with society and nature have been disrupted, never to be established again. For various reasons, they did not have the functions, income, skills and identity to meet the demands of modern life. They felt the need to take shelter in traditional values, thought and behavior patterns in order to be protected. Therefore, they remained in opposition to the secular social order.

However, the traditional world that they wanted to take shelter in, once slipped under their feet. From the cities where they migrated with a thousand hopes to their villages; Although they want to go to their homeland from the foreign countries where they go to work for economic reasons, they can no longer return easily. Their ties with the realm they left behind have been greatly weakened or even severed.

In the shantytowns of big cities, population clusters larger than the inner-city population have virtually "sieged" the cities. Turks are forming ghettos in foreign countries. They stand on the edge of a new lifestyle they face, but they can't get into it, they can't integrate with it. Most of them are in better condition economically than before. But it is not safer, more peaceful. Despite their new economic opportunities, they are experiencing a crisis called status instability in socio-scientific language, caused by not being able to reach a more prestigious social position.

Still, their biggest conflict is cultural. The culture they came out of, which shaped their emotions, thoughts and behavior patterns, has lost its functionality in the face of the culture of the social environment they have to participate in. He does not "carry" them, so to speak. They began to experience a culture shock.

According to scientific data, people who fail to fulfill their expectations or who cannot overcome the low status or culture shock in which they are imprisoned go into an identity crisis; they are entering. Worldwide studies have shown that there is a strong correlation between identity crisis and status instability.

The person or social group, who has lost its traditional social role and its social status, enters into an identity crisis and protests this situation, unless it acquires a new and distinctive role in modern social life and a new and better status related to that role. It is usual for such individuals and groups to spread their perceived status instability to the whole society and to present the society as if it is in the grip of a great instability.

VII. THE PROGRAM OF THOSE AGAINST SEcularism

There are two basic suggestions put forward by the sections who oppose the secular social order and way of life to overcome the social problems(s) that they perceive and express as a "crisis":

1) To fix the deteriorated social balances; prevent widespread injustice; slowing down or at least controlling the social change that is uncertain what it will bring and where it will stop; To try to establish an error-free order in order to eliminate the unfair practices of the administration and its mistakes and omissions in order to ensure social welfare.

2) The society's inability to develop as much as desired despite all efforts, and its inability to reach prosperity, is due to the weakness of the Western development model, which has guided us until now, and that it does not fit our structure. The Western way of life includes such a social and economic model that on the one hand, it exploits the countries that are trying to develop and makes them fall behind; On the other hand, it corrupts their morals by pushing them to excessive consumption and pretentiousness. So, it is a moral act to oppose the West. After all, Islamic protest is not just an act of creating a just and safe society, but a search for a moral order.

Both proposals aim at one goal: to create an Islamic society. Islamic decrees will not only form the basis of law, but also make a moral understanding based on Sharia dominant in society. Everything that concerns individual and social life, from women's veiling to cutting off the hand of a thief, from combining the worldly and religious authorities to the management of the society by a board of clergy (that is, through the guardianship system), will be brought into conformity with the provisions of the Qur'an, the traditions of the Hadith and the Sunnah.

The reason for this proposal is clear: the masses, who cannot find a suitable place in it, want to change the society that does not change in the direction they want or does not reflect the structure they desire, according to the principles they prefer. Although this "idealized" model of society is based on a "golden age", an "exemplary" past period, they also know that this is just an analogy.

The reason behind this proposal is clear: the desire to re-establish and shape the society, which does not or does not offer a safe and reasonable lifestyle in its existing form, according to the principles they prefer... This innocent and "reasonable" desire actually embodies a radical, even revolutionary, strategy. carries.

The ideal model proposed is Hz. It is the form of social and administrative organization of the period of Muhammad and the Four Caliphs.

This “golden age” has these virtues:

1) Islamic society was a supranational unity of races, colours, nations and states. It was a "union of believers", that is, of believers. It is believed that since this unity rejects nationalism, national divisions will not arise among believers.

However, there was no nation in the modern sense at the time of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs. The period in question corresponds to a pre-national social organization. Since the social organization was based on the tribal order in this period, there were no obvious inequalities such as class differences between individuals and social groups. The union or community of believers, formed by relatively equal individuals, is inevitably solidary and helpful. But today's Islamic radicals, who ignore these historical facts, ignore how societies have changed and become more complex in our age, and take the organization of the community in the first twenty years of Islam as an example at the beginning of the 7th century.

They take this one step further and make reviving this idealized example the center of their political programs and ideological discourses today. However, there is no state organization in this idealized "golden age". There is a phenomenon of self-management based on participatory and joint decision making. Need Hz. Muhammad, as well as the Four Caliphs, are leaders of a community or umma rather than a head of state; They are imams. In this management model, there is no institution of leadership above and beyond the congregation. The Prophet is the messenger of Allah, not the deputy. There is no problem with his acceptance as a leader. The Four Caliphs that followed were generally approved by the members of the umma or elected to the leadership of the community.

Therefore, there is an organic and direct relationship between the community of believers (ummah) and the Imam. There is no disconnect between the wishes and needs of the Ummah and the Imam's decisions to meet them. This identity is based on two reasons:

1) Most of the decisions taken are based on the provisions of the Qur'an, Sunnah (that is, what the Prophet did ex officio) and Hadith (what he said).

The grounds of legitimacy are firm and beyond doubt.

2) The imam and the ummah are two organic elements of a social-legal union in which the executive and the legislature are identical. They are not separated from each other by bureaucratic structures. The joint decision making and the election of the leader gave the participatory and solidarist government style in the first decades of Islam an attractive “communal democracy” appearance.

The last of the first Four Caliphs to be elected, Hz. After the murder of Ali and his sons Hasan and Hüseyin a few years apart, Muaviye, who became the Caliph, and the Umayyad dynasty named after him, became the imam of the head of state; therefore, it has turned it into a hereditary institution. The views of those who support the leader to remain as a community leader and an imam, and those who support the state and bureaucratization of the growing Ummah and the conflict of interest regarding their own roles, played a major role in the desire to liquidate the last three of the already elected four Caliphs by killing them.

Individuals and groups, who saw their place and interests damaged in the Islamic organization, which was transformed from a tribal union to a community of tribes and reached the size of an empire in a short time, opposed this centralization.

One of the first to oppose the transformation of the imamate into the head of state and alienation from the community of believers founded on values ​​such as equality and solidarity, was Hz. It was the Shiites who embraced the tradition of Ali. Shiites, who have remained faithful to the thesis that the Islamic administration has been corrupted, secularized and usurped by unjust people, have argued that no non-religious authority is legitimate and that it should be followed. Therefore, they created a hierarchical clergy organization independent of the state, which did not exist in the Sunni tradition. The organization in question was founded and kept alive against the worldly authority, which they considered illegitimate in principle. The Iranian Revolution is an example of a political struggle that this religious organization gave and won against the worldly authority, which lost its power and popular support, that is, the Shah's rule.

However, the example of Iran is unique, and Shiites make up only seven percent (7%) of all Muslims in the Islamic world. In that case, what does the movement called "Islamic Radicalism", which overcomes the Shiite-Sunni division and adopts the example of the religious state established in Iran as an acceptable model, predicts what?

So much comparative research has been done on this subject that despite the sectarian and political-national differences, the common goals, enemies and principles of the members and supporters of the Radical Islamic Organization of around 2000, which exist among the nearly one billion Muslim mass, are clearly known. What are the common beliefs of these radical individuals and groups who reject secularism altogether?

1) Islam is a whole, a whole way of life. No area of ​​life can be considered apart from the provisions of the religion of Islam. After the period of the Prophet and the Four Caliphs, the corrupt worldly authorities that separated from this view have become the cause of immorality, disorder, injustice, tyranny and economic backwardness in the face of the West. In that case, all these corrupt authorities and forms of government should be destroyed and replaced by the provisions of the Qur'an and Sunnah, which ensured the purity of the first decades of Islam. In summary, religion (faith), politics, state administration and social life should be brought back into an inseparable unity.

2) The economic, political and military weakness of most Islamic countries is primarily the result of turning their backs on the rules of the religion of Islam. Then a second mistake was made to eliminate the drawbacks of this deviation:

The secular, corrupt and alien values ​​and ideologies of the West were thought of as an antidote to salvation. However, neither liberal nationalism nor Marxist socialism of the West is a realistic way out. The solution to the problems is found in Islam.

All you have to do is return to it.

3) The way to return to Islam, just like Hz. It is to ensure the unity of social and political life under an Islamic system of government and law, through a wholesale revolution, as Muhammad did. Every institution, cluster and management style that resists this radical transformation must be liquidated. Because they are “false”, they have deviated from the path of truth and justice.

4) Advocates of Islamic society do not exclude technology as in the past, but they want to limit and control the modernization brought by new technology within the framework of the understanding of "Islamic society". In other words, it won't get stuck in a traditional, tech locomotive. Modern technology will snag and follow the traditional locomotive.

How realistic are these claims and suggestions? Let's start with the approach of Islamic Radicals to the phenomenon of nationalism:

According to them, the concept of nation is artificial and divisive. It is invented to separate believers from each other, to establish and legitimize the power of some tyrants and profiteers. There is only one source of legitimacy and power, and that is God. Every other form of power is to associate with God.

First of all, it should be said that religion existed long before the nation and nationalism. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam has undergone different interpretations in the face of the conditions of worldly life. Because Muslims had different positions in terms of region, tribe, tradition, language, social and economic status. There were contradictions, conflicts, differences of interest among them. If we add to these the separate and warring leaderships, we have to admit that Islam was born into a divided world from the very beginning. Despite all the unifying feature of religion, these differences did not disappear. As with other religions, it was interpreted in accordance with living conditions and those who practiced them. Sects were born, sects gave way to sects. In short, religion was affected by it as much as it affected social life, it changed. Although it was a pre-national value system, it could not prevent social differentiation and could not prevent the emergence of nations and national states. Because nations are socio-political organizations required by growing and developing societies and complex division of labor. It has been the religion of much more primitive communities, but less than two hundred of these communities have been nationalized until today.

The national society is the product of the Industrial Revolution and was established as a result of the war against all kinds of intellectual taboos that prevent the formation of an industrial society, dogma that sterilises scientific research. The war in question was not fought only in the intellectual and cultural field. The real battleground is politics. The authorities, which were deemed to be out of control, unquestionable and uncritical because they were absolute and usually of divine origin, were destroyed by popular movements and left their place to popular regimes.

Popular authorities did not derive their legitimacy from being members of a dynasty or being God's chosen servants. The source of their power is the popular support that makes them power.

It can be seen that the source of power has been religion for many centuries. But the members of the developing and modernizing societies have opposed the authorities, who keep them under absolute control in action and thought, but who are not themselves controlled. Understanding that freedom of thought and enterprise can only be secured by a libertarian form of government, people did not withhold their criticism of everything absolute from absolutist governments. Because they knew that absolute thought is the child of absolute governments. Taboos, dogmas, prohibitions of thought and initiative live in the bosom of arbitrary, tyrannical and bigoted governments.

In the light of this evaluation, after centuries of struggles, people overthrew all kinds of monarchical, feudal and theocratic authorities that were not the product of their own will and were not based on their own choices. They would no longer be told what to believe, what to think, what to do, by others, by people and groups they did not authorize. In this way, they were not only liberated from the plan of thought and enterprise. They were also liberated on the plan of belief. Thus, they prevented absolute or theocratic powers from registering people's freedom of belief and diversity.

In a secular society, the fields of thought and belief were not only separated from each other, but also gained their freedom to the extent that they became independent. Thus, science, which is the product of reason and rational thought, had the opportunity to develop in an unbanned and competitive environment where all ideas were tested against reality; they are free from the untestable subjectivity of belief. On the other hand, beliefs are freed from the domination and intolerance of both each other and various currents of thought. In this sense, secularism became the guarantee of freedoms.

The secularism understanding of Republican Turkey was formed in the light of this evaluation and historical experiences. The existence of freedom of thought and conscience in the Republic of Turkey is due to the fact that beliefs are kept in the spiritual space they belong to, and they are not accepted as guides to direct social life and political institutions. This point of view, which constitutes the essence of laicism, was also included in the Turkish Constitution, while freedom of belief and worship was taken under the guarantee of the state, and conversion of religious organizations into political organs was prohibited.

Our Constitution has seen religious organizations with political aims not as formations aimed at meeting spiritual needs, but as formations oriented towards action (struggle for power). In the eyes of the legislator, every belief system that loses its spiritual quality and comes to the plan of action is politicized.

Knowing that religion, which has become a political tool, will change the social life and state administration in line with its own principles, the legislator has also created the necessary mechanisms for the secular regime and democracy to protect itself. The Turkish Constitutions found it dangerous and contradictory for the fascist, communist and sharia state advocates to take advantage of the freedoms and organizational freedoms afforded by democracy with totalitarian demands. The legislator believes that only those who believe in democracy should benefit from the blessings of democracy.

In fact, the modern understanding of law does not respect the concept of "thought crime". Crime is created by action. Laws, then, should be measures by which action is evaluated. However, it may be too late to catch a philosophy red-handed in its action plan, whose only goal in its intellectual repertoire is to confine all areas of life to the narrow mold of a single belief system, to establish a total control over the society, and to do this by force. Giving the right to organize legally in the name of democracy to a group that has declared its purpose as establishing a sharia-state means that democracy surrenders the weapon that will shoot itself to its enemy. This is the main reason why the Constitutions of the Republic consider reactionary and reactionary organizations illegal.

VII. INQUIRY OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND SEcularism

There has always been a deep-rooted conservatism in Turkey. This is true for every society. However, it cannot be said that a serious debate on laicism was opened in the public until the 1970s.

This was changed by the cumulative effect of social change and economic development, which reached a structural change in the 1970s. Processes such as industrialization, urbanization, internal and external migrations have profoundly affected the expectations and world views of people who have changed the cultural climate. Faced with a better "world", people kept wanting even better. They adhered to rational and worldly solutions. They adopted laicism as the basis of their worldview. But there were also people who were caught between two different ways of life, both in the poor areas and suburbs of their own countries and in the ghettos of foreign countries. They chose to blame the social and political order that forced them to migrate, to change their world, to live in environments with which they had difficulty adapting, as the cause of their distress. They began to question and criticize the republican regime and the basic principles that kept it alive. They abandoned the social alliance aimed at keeping the republic alive.

Secondly, the mentioned people needed a value system and social order that they could replace the traditional way of life and social culture that they had left and could no longer return to. Since the social system to which they were subject and its political and economic institutions were the root cause of their problems, the solution should not be sought in them. A reliable, fair and stable order had to be established.

This order is new but known, rooted in historical experiences; fair but stable, changing rapidly and not leaving people in a vacuum; that the laws are free from human error and arbitrariness; should not be alien, divisive and divisive, but unifying, solidary, and bound by rules and principles that no one would doubt. All the expectations of this "neo-traditional" search began to be sought within the fiction of a "contemporary" religious state, which was believed to fully answer the problems of today's society. The representatives of this current are called radical or fundamentalist Islamists.

In the light of this evaluation, it can be seen that radical Islam is the product of a contemporary crisis. It is necessary not to characterize it with a simple label of reaction and make it meaningless. Establishing a fundamentalist Islamic society is the utopia of people who are in the throes of development, between a world that no longer exists and a world they cannot enter. Building a new building on old foundations makes perfect sense to people who are stuck with the demands of modern society. Because there is a template, even if it is theoretical, and they will apply it themselves. People who have been on the sidelines of a world that has always been established and managed by others have been given the opportunity to take an active role in the political scene.

The rapid economic and social change in Turkey, which gained continuity after the 1970s, and the political communities and crises it caused, kept the search for an alternative regime to the secular republic on the agenda until today. Of course, this phenomenon is not a development unique to Turkey. In all Islamic countries struggling with structural change problems, radical Islamic movements have appeared on the political scene with similar organizations and programs.

Radical Islamic discourse developed mostly as a form of political protest of the lower and lower-middle social strata. What determines the content of this discourse is the economic and social problems in which these social sections falter and their consequences. What is meant by the results is how these difficulties are reflected first in their own lives and then in the life of society.

Individuals in economic hardship are naturally forced to renounce their moral values. The spread of behaviors that do not conform to tradition and are perceived as shameful, sinful and sometimes criminal by fundamentalist circles cause them to judge the entire social order morally. Because their level of knowledge does not allow to judge otherwise. The first thing they say is that the society that has lost its morality must either be made moral again or, if it is not "correcting its ability", it is necessary to dissolve it and re-establish it.

His justifications are so plausible as to be pleasing to the broad masses: A moral society is not formed solely by the virtuous behavior and self-sacrifice of individuals. Without a just administration, individuals cannot maintain their virtues. Justice is to offer everyone the opportunity to live with dignity, without taking sides. To balance the income distribution. It is not to allow people to abuse each other. Justice is removing corrupt rulers from work. Justice is to defend moral values, not material values. Because the biggest source of injustice and immorality is pumping consumption without providing the necessary means of acquisition. The consumer society is the greenhouse of immorality. In that case, the unjust, corrupt rulers must go and the consumption sickness they spread must be cured.

It seems that the Islamic protest, although using a religious symbolism, is to put a finger on extremely pragmatic issues. So why choose such a traditional symbolism?

Modern political tools are not yet fully established in the aforementioned sections. Representative democracy is based on participation. However, researches show that political participation is more intense among middle and upper social strata. The participation of the lower and lower-middle strata in the political process is mostly in the form of voting. This is a very passive type of participation. As such, sub-social groups cannot adequately acquire the organizational, ideological and practical political habits and knowledge required by active participation. They do not understand the structure and functioning of the system, so they do not know how to influence or change it.

The inability to know and influence alienates various social groups from the social system. They want to change a social order that they do not feel belonged to, even that they believe they are excluded, to an order that they can shape with their own will and that seems “familiar” to them. Many elements of this “familiar” order are found in religious cultures and Ottoman practice. Moreover, they are perhaps even more deeply rooted in the consciousness of society, since they have a much longer history than secular national culture.

On the other hand, scientific findings have revealed that in order for people to participate in the political process, they must see within themselves the power to influence or change it. This is not enough either. People should also believe that the political-social system can change and improve with their own efforts. Individuals who are convinced of both issues participate in the political process through existing rules, methods and institutions.

In addition, groups representing the Islamic lifestyle have become alienated from the societies they live in in Turkey and in the Islamic world. They perceive them as irreparably corrupted. Therefore, they reject the political institutions and political methods established in these societies from the beginning. These are the "inventions of the servant" and the servants easily follow the devil or are mistaken. However, a socio-political order that will be established according to the provisions of the Qur'an, which is the product of God's infallible mind, will not leave room for human errors. Dominion belongs to Allah. Those who argue otherwise are tyrants and profiteers who usurp sovereignty for their own benefit.

In such an order, the problem of political participation has also been resolved. While every servant obeys the divine laws unconditionally and willingly, a team of clergy who apply God's orders on his behalf will also perform executive, legislative and judicial functions.

Such a political system, based on the principle of "union of forces", also relieves people's fear and depression about making the right decisions in a modernizing and complex world. The clergy, who make and implement decisions on behalf of the whole of society, represent people who are afraid to bear the responsibility of making complex decisions for themselves. They save them from being wrong and harming themselves and the society. This is the summary of the idealized understanding of society and politics of the Islamic radicals. This is an openly totalist worldview. It advocates controlling and directing every moment and every area of ​​human and social life.

Well, do these "religious experts", who emerged to meet all the needs of society, really have the professional expertise to meet the various demands of daily practice? It is not possible to give a positive answer to this question. Then, will the mistakes and mistakes expected from the secular servant not be committed by the religious leaders of the society?

On the other hand, the evolution of political history has been from unity of powers to separation of powers. In this way, the absolute authorities were destroyed and the social functions that were gathered in one hand and the political power they provided were divided. The divided political power fields were independently institutionalized and formed a polyphonic political system by controlling each other.

Separation of powers and polyphony are both prerequisites and guarantees of democracy. However, Islamic radicalism offers us the principle of unity of forces, as if it were a new invention and a way of salvation. This is a contradiction, at least in terms of historical experience.

History shows that every society is organized within the framework of a division of labor appropriate to the level of development it has reached. The need to meet various social needs leads to the formation of different social groups and strata. These groups and strata establish representative political organizations that will take on the function of defending their interests, meeting their aspirations and expressing their world views (ideologies). Or they support existing organizations that they believe best meet their needs. To the extent that this organizational pluralism transforms into ideological-political polyphony, the basis of a regime of freedoms is formed.

However, for freedoms to last, they must be secured. Otherwise, a social power that seizes power can force its own interests and group ideology to the whole society by abolishing all political freedoms.

Since such a concentration of power leads to authoritarian governments, people who have had bitter experiences have seen the guarantee of democracy in the principle of separation of powers. What is separation of powers? It is a political practice that is used to ensure that the social order is not based on oppression, oppression, or the will of the minorities, and therefore can be democratic and stable. It is the making of the main functions (functions) that ensure public order, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary from each other.

For Atatürk and his ideal friends, who wanted to establish and maintain a modern Republic, the principle of separation of powers constituted the essence of democratic government. They thought: Legislature is the law-making power and function exercised by assemblies (parliament, congress) composed of representatives elected by the people through free elections. Suggestions and solutions created by the elected deputies (deputies) representing all segments of the society, by consensus among themselves, are the most accurate and democratic way of solving social problems. Laws created in this way are more stable and permanent. In addition, they do not withstand force, coercion. They emerge as a result of negotiations that reconcile the different interests and wishes of various social segments and bring them closer to each other. In addition, the legislature, representing the will of the people,

The executive function is fulfilled by elected governments and bureaucracy representing continuity and expertise in the civil service. Thus, the executive (executive or administration) consists of both an elected and temporary political wing and a permanent bureaucratic and technocratic administrative wing. With this two-winged structure, the executive is open to both the requirements of the day, political pursuits and opinions. It also ensures continuity in basic policies and staff stability. The executive branch implements the decisions taken by the legislature and the laws it makes. With this function, the two organs are connected to each other, but they are independent.

The judiciary examines whether both organs act in accordance with the constitution, established legal order and fairness in the decisions they make, the laws they make and their implementation. With this function, the judiciary is like the safety valve of the society. Therefore, it should be independent from other organs. The more independent these three functions and the institutions and organs that perform them in a society are, the more they control each other and correct their mistakes. Therefore, that society becomes democratic and contemporary to that extent. It can adapt to the conditions of the day and respond to their demands. This is the Kemalist understanding of contemporary state and social organization.

However, there is a call for a full union of forces in the proposal for a religious state. Democracy is a corrupt Western concept for religious radicals; it is a scam. Because lawmaking is an unnecessary process. Sharia is enough. As God's command, it is unquestionably accurate and true. After all, sovereignty belongs to God. To talk about the sovereignty of the servant is to associate with his power. This is sin. In that case, taking over the executive and establishing a legal system based on the will of the society is not a case to be defended. If there is only one will that dominates the universe, everything and everyone must be subject to it. The administration, then, must be exercised by the clergy, who undertake the realization of God's will. Therefore, there is no need for political parties and politicians. Because politics is a meaningless pursuit.

As for the radical Islamists' understanding of the judiciary: Sharia provisions form the basis of the legal system. Not only the state administration, but also social life and daily events are interpreted and regulated in accordance with the Shari'a. Everyone must abide by these terms, interpretations and practices. Because they are not human-made, they are divine.

It seems that the proposal of a religious state totally rejects the self-determination of man by his will. Total with the principle of “forces-union”; envisages an extremely authoritarian form of government that controls everything. Therefore, the concept of "democracy" is one of the forbidden words in the lexicon of Radical Islamists who adopt a totalitarian understanding of society and administration.

However, according to the cadres who founded the Republic, no society that has reached the maturity to govern itself can leave its self with such a surrender to the leadership of cadres equipped with ideas far behind the times. Thought, faith; cannot surrender science to faith. It separates the two from each other and sees them as independent sources that meet their material and spiritual needs.

The understanding that there can be no democracy without secularism lies at the basis of Kemalist thought. Because, if secularism is not adopted, reason and will will be left to the fanaticism of belief. Therefore, while defending democracy, Atatürk never envisaged creating a "uniform", that is, a uniform society. Like the examples he followed in the West, he aimed to create a harmonious society by establishing reconciliations and alliances between different social sections. In fact, he saw differences as the richness of social life. Those differences will form the dynamics of social development with new syntheses.

However, the non-secular way of thinking wants to stereotype everything in thought, ideal, social and political life by putting the material and spiritual existence of man under the total control of religion and to tie it to immutable rules. This is why religious ideology is skeptical of social change. He perceives it as a corruption, a corruption. Because the act of changing (reform, revolution) is voluntary and rational. How can the human will, that is, the human mind, which has a great possibility of making mistakes, replace the divine order? “Since the material universe is a divine miracle; The social universe, as a part of it, should not be left to the whims of the human mind and will.

As it is seen, the non-secular way of thinking, in other words, the way of evaluation based on belief, looks at the mind with suspicion. It is against rationalism and the principle that reason is the guide of human and social life.

The form of evaluation based on belief, called dogma, is closed to doubt and proof. As such, it is also against science, which is open to doubt, change and evidence even about knowledge, findings and its own methods. The relationship between science and laicism becomes concrete at this point. Because scientific knowledge is knowledge that has been proven (proven) by meticulous methods. Dogma is only what is believed to be true. More precisely, it is faith.

However, what is interesting is that, despite their opposition to the questioning, critical, investigative and limitless libertarianism of scientific thought, religious radicals adopt science and technique, which are its products, due to their instrumental qualities. They have to adopt. Moreover, while doing this, without being conscious of the intellectual contradiction they fell into.

The great Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, put rational thought before dogma, with the saying "science is the most genuine guide". He emphasized that the guide that will illuminate the path of the republican regime is science. With this determination, he also determined the cultural direction of modern Turkey: Turkish society will reach modern civilization through science and rational thought.

The guidance of science can only be achieved to the extent that societies are purified from dogma. In that case, there is a directly proportional relationship between secularism and scientific development and the spread of rational thought. Republican Turkey is the product of cadres who understand this well.

Two other phenomena closely related to secularism are individual freedoms and creativity. Dogmatic thinking is not only closed to change, democracy and science, but also against individual creativity and the freedoms that feed this creativity. Above all, dogmaticians see creativity as a divine right and privilege. However, the issue here is not the creation of man and the universe, which is peculiar to God. It is to create new ideas, products and possibilities by making maximum use of the opportunities and abilities provided to us on the created world. Personal creativity means achieving the best possible harmony between one's own nature and the universal nature. Therefore, this perspective takes the conditions lived in it as a given, not as a destiny. How to best evaluate this data, if necessary, explores what can be changed, questions. The possibilities he seeks and explores already exist within the perfect fiction of nature. The aim is to understand that mysterious fiction and make the most of it. However, dogmatic thinking is fatalistic. He sees the world living in it not as a given, but as the inevitable result of an unquestionable divine plan. Such a perspective is necessarily closed to scientific research and individual creativity. Therefore, it is in favor of registering the freedoms of thinking, research, expression and behavior that feed human creativity. The servant is a natural being. He was created with the task of living in a realm bestowed upon him, not in a social realm that he shaped. is to understand that mysterious fiction and to make the most of it. However, dogmatic thinking is fatalistic. He sees the world living in it not as a given, but as the inevitable result of an unquestionable divine plan. Such a perspective is necessarily closed to scientific research and individual creativity. Therefore, it is in favor of registering the freedoms of thinking, research, expression and behavior that feed human creativity. The servant is a natural being. He was created with the task of living in a realm bestowed upon him, not in a social realm that he shaped. is to understand that mysterious fiction and to make the most of it. However, dogmatic thinking is fatalistic. He sees the world living in it not as a given, but as the inevitable result of an unquestionable divine plan. Such a perspective is necessarily closed to scientific research and individual creativity. Therefore, it is in favor of registering the freedoms of thinking, research, expression and behavior that feed human creativity. The servant is a natural being. He was created with the task of living in a realm bestowed upon him, not in a social realm that he shaped. individual creativity. Therefore, it is in favor of registering the freedoms of thinking, research, expression and behavior that feed human creativity. The servant is a natural being. He was created with the task of living in a realm bestowed upon him, not in a social realm that he shaped. individual creativity. Therefore, it is in favor of registering the freedoms of thinking, research, expression and behavior that feed human creativity. The servant is a natural being. He was created with the task of living in a realm bestowed upon him, not in a social realm that he shaped.

In order to destroy this passive (passive) point of view and to replace it with secular thought, Republican Turkey has abolished traditional educational institutions that oppress the mind and use the individual with its large-scale educational, cultural and legal reforms. The new (secular) education system adopted aimed at raising people who, in Atatürk's words, “with free mind and free conscience”. The distance covered on this path has led to the training of intellectuals and artists who will compete with their colleagues in the most developed countries today. However, it cannot be said that we have yet reached the goal of reaching the level of contemporary civilization that Atatürk showed.

IX. WHY WILL THE SEcular REPUBLIC LIVE?

We know the reasons and reasons why the theocratic order and its institutions were abandoned to the depths of history. But we also know that secularism, one of the main values ​​on which the social and political system is based in Turkey, has started to be questioned again. Will the secular republic be able to resist these pressures?

Such a discussion should be based on structural criteria rather than speculative and philosophical. What is meant by this is to identify who defends and will defend secularism, and for what reasons, despite all the opposite currents and groups in Turkey. Another question that needs to be answered is why the groups and organizations that pioneered anti-secular tendencies do not have a real chance of success today.

Let's start our analysis with the first test of the religious alternative in multi-party political life: The National Salvation Party, which emerged on the political scene by drawing attention to the need for religious values ​​to guide social life, received 12% and 8% of the votes in the 1973 and 1977 national general elections, respectively.

It can be seen that the National Salvation Party, which was the ruling partner in the coalition governments established after both general elections, lost votes despite having the advantage of being in power. The Turkish electorate has been able to distinguish, with great maturity, between adherence to religious beliefs and the fact that religion forms a political front. In addition, the voters tested the MSP, which appeared on the political scene with the claim that it offered a new alternative, at the level of political practice, and withdrew some of its initial support.

We do not know the support of the National Salvation Party in the following years. Because the emergency administration, which was established after the military intervention to end the political instability that reached its peak in September 1980 and the terrorism that took dozens of lives every day, dissolved all political parties. The aim was to create a new alliance on the Republic and its core principles.

In the political process that started to fail in 1983 with the parties that declared that they were in compliance with this alliance, a second party that presented the Islamic alternative to the electorate on a democratic basis participated in the competition. The Welfare Party, which participated in the last general elections held in 1987, received only seven percent of the total votes. With this rate of votes, it cannot be said that the Welfare Party has a wide mass support. As a matter of fact, the RP was not able to pass the ten percent threshold set at the national level, nor the higher thresholds set at the local level, to get deputies into the Parliament. This situation greatly reduces the political effectiveness of the said Party and minimizes its power to influence the decisions taken at the national level.

From another point of view, it can be seen that the Welfare Party provides the most support from the provinces and regions, which are quite backward and where traditional values ​​and lifestyles continue to influence. These segments, who are fighting for existence in front of a rapidly changing social structure, industrialization and commercialization processes, do not have much chance in the Turkey of the future. However, slow progressing industrialization cannot affect social change at the desired speed and scale. Therefore, the economy is rapidly getting rid of the pluralism of small units, delaying the arrival of large enterprises in a short time.

Because of the relatively slow-growing industry, the surplus rural population is flowing into the cities to take on casual jobs, not as industrial workers. Large sections of the population, which have become urbanized without adopting the logic of machinery and modern technology, the pace of work and the lifestyle of the industrial society, largely preserve their traditional values ​​and behavior patterns. In fact, they not only protect, they cling to them even more to suppress their feelings of rootlessness and detachment. Islamist radicals, who want to take advantage of this situation, take advantage of the anxieties of the masses who are out of modern life but have moved away from their old ways of life, and call on them to be supporters of a religious state that will protect them. But the available data show that despite all these efforts, the Islamic alternative is

Another important reason preventing the establishment of a Sharia state like Iran in Turkey is the legal status of the clergy. In our country, there is no clergy organization independent of the official staff of the state. In the Sunni tradition, the imam comes out of the congregation and his mission is functional rather than formal. The congregation is a voluntary association of believers. Officers in voluntary unions are not the product of a strict hierarchy, whether they are appointed by a professional organization (in our case, the Presidency of Religious Affairs) or elected by the congregation. Therefore, they do not represent their own independent group interests other than the interests of the official organization they belong to and the community they serve.

However, in Shiite Iran, there is a hierarchical organization of clergy reminiscent of the Christian clergy. In terms of their income, educational institutions, places of worship and staffing, they were able to survive independently of the state until they took over it. Therefore, they played the leading role of opposition and rebellion against the Shah's regime.

The fact that clergy were public officials in Turkey prevented their economic and administrative autonomy and ensured that they remained loyal to the regime. This was the aim of the republican administration. Therefore, the organization of clergy in our country cannot collect taxes for religious purposes, as in Iran, for example. They cannot be the owners of foundations established for religious purposes. Religious foundations are legally under state control and how their income is spent is controlled by official authorities.

On the other hand, clergy cannot open and operate independent private mosques and religious schools on their own initiative. Even if these are established by private individuals and organizations, their supervision and personnel appointments are made by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (state). The Presidency also draws the curriculum of the activities carried out in these places of worship.

As it is seen, apart from state control and organization, there is no official and independent religious organization in Turkey; nor a legitimate group of clergy endowed with extraordinary powers... In that case, the fact that the autonomous religious organization followed in the example of Iran contradicts the state and the activities of the clergy become independent from the general policy of the state are out of question for Turkey. At least, it hasn't happened before.

As they are not independent from the state, the members of the clergy organization in Turkey have not led the traditionalist and reactionary opposition as a cadre, no matter how conservative they are. One of the biggest reasons for this is that the state is generally reformist and social justice in Turkey.

But today, we are witnessing a different political opposition being organized under the guise of religion. The rings of this organization are sects bearing various names. Under the name of "Sect", many traditional individuals and groups have tried to find common solutions to their daily social and economic problems. They neither have the patience to wait for the solutions of these problems in the heavy and official structures of public institutions, nor do they believe that they can be solved.

One reason for disbelief stems from the nature of their demands. Because these demands are far from the general development strategy of the state to catch up with the era; they are generally wishes that contradict with growth, development and modernization in the short term. Therefore, the members of the sect are in an effort to establish financial and administrative organizations that will meet their needs and wishes as soon as possible, independently of the state. Their long-term strategy is to influence the policies of the state by educating the members of the sect and placing them at the crucial points of the public sector; to seize in the future. However, due to legal drawbacks, they cannot express their efforts within the framework of political terminology. Instead, they take refuge in religious terminology.

The religious institution, which has deep roots in our national culture, helps them to provide the necessary security. However, the guarantee in question also has its limits: according to the relevant provisions of the Penal Code and the Constitution, religion cannot be used as a political tool and the established order of the state cannot be changed for religious purposes. As a matter of fact, two political parties have been closed since 1970 on the grounds that they used religion as an instrument in politics. Members of some unofficial religious organizations (sects) were arrested and prosecuted for committing crimes against the Constitution when they engaged in subversive and separatist activities.

To date, Islamic fundamentalism has not been perceived as a serious threat to the regime. In fact, Islamic morality has been seen as an antidote to left radicalism, which is believed to be caused by a lack of faith by official circles.

On the other hand, the Islamic movement seeks influence in Turkey quite openly, not in secrecy. Therefore, when it gets out of control, it is watched carefully by the Kemalist forces who believe that they can control it.

The third reason that keeps secularism alive in Turkey is this: The majority of the Turkish population has not lost their faith in the development model adopted with the proclamation of the Republic. This model is based on the competitive market economy and reformism principles based on democracy, secularism, free enterprise and private property. In this model, freedom instead of tyranny; competitive entrepreneurship instead of the stagnation of collectivism; Instead of dogma, scientificity was prioritized. The determined goal is clear: to reach the level of contemporary civilization... If this goal is to be achieved through democracy and the democratic society model is to be defended to the end, it seems that we have enough evidence to be hopeful on this issue: the nationwide publications published in Sabah Newspaper on May 3, 1988. According to the results of a research, 76% of Turkish people. 4 of them believe that “whatever its shortcomings, democracy is the best form of government”. Only 12.4% of the population thinks that “democracy is a luxury for the country”.

Besides mass support for democracy, another positive indicator is the nature of the main opposition. The Social Democratic Populist Party, which represents the main opposition in Turkey, has a social democratic tendency as its name suggests. It is clear that extreme right and extreme left currents should not be included in this trend.

Looking at the problem from a broader perspective, it is seen that both the ruling party and the third largest opposition party are generally secular and modernist, despite broad coalitions at their bases. In this political climate, despite all the efforts to the contrary, it is not possible for the reactionary and reactionary pursuits to find a wide sphere of influence for now. Such a danger can only arise if the Republic of Turkey fails to reach the “contemporary civilization” it has chosen as its target, with the political and economic model it has adopted.

Those who support democratic left ideas in Turkey do not intend to act together with “religious radicals”, who are also revisionists, just to oppose the established order. -It should not be the other way around. Therefore, the Turkish “Democratic Left” cannot be expected to make the mistake of supporting the Mullahs in their ascent to power, as in Iran. The Turkish Democratic Left seems to have understood that such cooperation would not only lead to the end of itself, but also to democracy.

From another point of view, religious radicals are revolutionary, no matter how backward they may appear. Instead of reforming the established system, which they believe is built on wrong foundations, they want to overthrow it and create a state order in accordance with the principles of Sharia. The social order they want to establish will be based on pre-national, pre-capitalist traditional relations and uncorrupted Islamic values ​​that no longer exist today.

This traditionalist point of view shares the same revolutionary methods with the "extreme left", which, however contradictory in thought, wants to impose a different socio-economic model on itself. In Iran, these two revolutionary powers collaborated to overthrow the Shah and his government.

It is very unlikely that such cooperation will be repeated in Turkey, in light of the lessons learned from the Iranian example. This is mainly because the Turkish Left generally believes in democracy, except for a small minority; the extreme right and left not adopting the revolutionary principles.

Another safety valve is that the Turkish people have never and in any way respected the extreme left.

Religious organizations and associations in Turkey are very diverse and contradictory. This difference can be observed not only in their worldviews, but also in their implementation programs. There are important differences between Sunni and Shiite philosophies and practices as well as the views, beliefs and practices arising from sects and established Sunni traditions. Often these differences take the form of open contradictions. For example, the Shiites in Turkey are progressive and democratic, considering the regime created by the Mullahs of the same sect in Iran. They have supported every social progress and modernization. Therefore, they have always given their shoulders to Atatürk and his secularization and modernization efforts. The belief of Turkish Shiites in democracy has been proven many times.

In summary, religious groups and organizations in Turkey are far from united under a common ideological umbrella and program of action. The only thing they agree on is the moral corruption observed in daily life, injustices in the economic field, corruption and perceived incompetence and inadequacies in the administrative field. For them, changing this "hopeless" picture in line with a "moral" order is the first issue of agreement between them.

The second thing they have in common is the search for a solid identity. The traditional socio-economic order to which they belonged has been dissolved. They are worried about not being able to find a suitable place for themselves in the new and modern world. Then they look back and cling to the only identity document they have from the past: “Muslim.”

The reflection of this identification, realized at the individual level, on the social plan is embodied in the desire to define the unity of believers. Believers - their unity (ummah) must be able to resist all the temptations of the age in order to survive. In the name of innovation and modernity, many perverted and wrong things are imposed on believers and they are removed from the pure, clean, protective and reliable roof of the ummah. The source of this deception is the West and its false values. Therefore, it is necessary to oppose and fight the West. The Ummah can prove its strength and existence to the extent that it can compete with the West.

However, there are also social forces in Turkey that are ready to oppose such an outdated program and worldview. It is not possible for big business circles, especially entrepreneurs in modern business lines, to turn their backs on the Republic and its contemporary philosophy, which has supported them since its foundation. Because this contemporary philosophy is based on scientific creativity, positive law, initiative and freedom of thought, which constitute the essence of Western civilization. The fact that the modern economy, which is the product of this philosophy, is not confined to dogmas and narrow patterns can only be secure under the democratic and secular republican administration.

On the other hand, the state is in organic cooperation with large enterprises in Turkey. It is inevitable that secularism, which is an inseparable part of the official ideology of the state, will also be adopted by business circles who take their chances of life from the support of the state.

In addition, the Turkish economy is opening up to the international market and competition with each passing day. Growing and developing economic enterprises do not see themselves limited to the national market. Considering that the manufacturing sector is increasingly gaining the opportunity to compete at the international level, it is unreasonable for the modern economic sectors of Turkey, which is preparing for full membership to the European Community, to see themselves in the camp that advocates a political-economic model that is behind the times.

Indeed, religious radicals in Turkey prefer small economic enterprises to large ones. By fueling xenophobia, they denounce openness and joint ventures with foreign entrepreneurs. They also glorify pre-industrial labor-capital relations. Thus, they prevent the crystallization and institutionalization of free and competitive relations that will lead to the establishment of a modern industrial society. It would be naive to expect that such a comprehensive and outdated code of behavior will be followed by the developing, growing, entrepreneurial segments that seek a place for themselves in the international arena by opening up to the world.

But it is impossible to show the same trust, especially for entrepreneurs in traditional lines of business. Small entrepreneurs, such as peasants, artisans, and artisans, who do not have the strength to cope with the whims of the market mechanism, feel insecure and uneasy. They hear very closely about the danger of extinction, especially during periods of extensive fluctuations such as economic stagnation and inflation. This makes them more susceptible to “calls for salvation,” promises of “better” or “brighter tomorrows” (or “pasts”), or even utopias. Because in the promised future, not only spiritual peace is offered, but also an “ideal” society that is resistant to sudden and destructive change. In this society, all social groups will live in harmony and cooperation, and they will not fear extinction.

Despite all these fears, the stage reached is not deprived of safety mechanisms to address the concerns of traditional lower social segments.

In a period of almost thirty years, Turkish people had the opportunity to use their sweat in foreign labor markets. Europe in particular, one and a half million; Opened in the last ten years, the Middle East Market has provided employment opportunities for approximately thirty thousand employees. When these numbers are considered together with their family members, they are approximately 1/10 (one tenth) of Turkey's population.

The money they sent from abroad or brought with them on certain return became a means of “upward mobility” for many individuals and families. It should not be unreasonable to expect that these people, whose income and status have risen, will remain loyal to the socio-economic order that provides them with this opportunity and its basic principles.

On the other hand, the job opportunity provided abroad did not only provide monetary gain. Many people, who were only in the category of peasants, unskilled laborers in their own country, have encountered contemporary social values ​​and behavior patterns in a modern world. While this training process affected the first generation employees, it left its mark on the second generation.

Now, there are descendants of the Turkish workers who were the first to settle abroad. This third generation consists entirely of European Turks. The majority of the international staff of Turkey, which will become a full member of the European Community, will probably come from among them. They are already Europeans of Turkish origin. With their values ​​and behavior, they reflect the basic norms of the modern environment in which they live. At the forefront of these norms is secularism.

Another safety mechanism is the new market opportunities that the expanding and modernizing national economy offers to some small business categories. Especially in the manufacturing and service sectors, many small enterprises have come to a position to keep up with the demands of the day by producing intermediate goods and services for new and large enterprises working with advanced technology. Particularly in the fields of automotive, electronics and machinery manufacturing, and the clothing industry, the link between large enterprises and small ones through sub-contracts has drawn many small enterprises into the technology of the age. The same situation is seen in tourism, banking and some service sectors that require computer use. The interests of those working in these segments naturally lie not in the past, but in the future. The future is to grow, to keep up with modern technology and when Turkey becomes a full member of the European Community,

Considering all these factors, it is difficult to imagine that a significant part of Turkish entrepreneurs, at least those who have adapted to the conditions of contemporary production and trade, will turn away from the system in which they were born and grow up and look to a more backward socio-economic system as an alternative. But it is a mistake to expect the same attitude from traditional and small-scale entrepreneurs (artisan, artisan, small-medium farmer) when faced with a long and insurmountable crisis.

Except for the possibility of an intense and prolonged economic crisis, it is out of the question for the Turkish business community to adopt radical or political Islam with the thought that it would limit the unlimited freedom of decision and action it is accustomed to. Moreover, the Shari'a order is aimed at controlling and directing not only the economic field, but also the entire social life. For the enterprising segment, which is characterized by innovation, creativity and freedom, adopting an order that contradicts these qualities means cutting their own veins with their hands. It is not possible to expect such a shortsightedness from Turkish businessmen who are competing in world markets.

The analysis, which includes why laicism has not lost its power as one of the basic principles of the regime in our country until today, highlighted six important points in this regard. To add a new one to these, we can define it as Turkey's 66-year tradition of parliamentary democracy.

Indeed, since its establishment in 1923, the Turkish people have sincerely preserved the secular republican form of government that was the product of their own will. He has proven his determination to protect in various exams.

One of the national powers that proudly emerges from these exams is the military and civilian bureaucracy. These bureaucratic cadres, who are the products of the modern and secular education system, see themselves as the last link of the modernization and secular state administration tradition. In order for this tradition to continue, contemporary social and political principles, which can be gathered under the name of "Ataturkism" in both military and civil schools, are transferred to younger generations as well as vocational education. All threats to the secular-democratic republican regime will pay off as long as the cadres trained with these values, in which secularism is at their center, remain in the state administration.

When all these factors are evaluated together, it does not seem possible to think that a social change that will shake the foundations of secularism in Turkey will take place in the short and medium term.

X. CONCLUSION

Why did the founders of the Turkish Republic accept secularism as the central value of their political philosophy and the regime? It is worth remembering once again. Secularism is, first of all, an ethical system independent of the rules of this or that religion. It is not immutable dogmas, transcendent power, or supra-social authority that determines the principles of such a moral understanding. It is a community of individuals committed to implementing them. Therefore, there is no compulsion in such an understanding of morality; It is democratic because it is based on a voluntary election.

On the other hand, secularism is based on freedom of thought and the right of individuals to differ in their opinions. In addition, secularism includes everything material or sacred; defends the right to discuss the immortality of the soul, conscientious choices, and all questions of moral responsibility. Therefore, secularism adopts rational research. Their dogma is against the unequivocal acceptance just because it is "sacred". He advocates continuous effort to examine the universe with scientific methods and to explain the findings with reason. It is thus opposed to theological and metaphysical absolutes.

The same opposition is valid for social institutions, practices and political ideologies that are claimed to be unchangeable and unchangeable, but which only serve to protect and camouflage certain interests.

Secular thought argues that happiness, social justice and goodness can be achieved not only in the next world, but also in this world.

Not sentimentality, but universality; to understand the whole, not the partial; adopts the principle of merit and success, not privilege (privilege). Because only in a social order based on these principles, people can get rid of metaphysics, locality, backwardness and the worship of authority.

Secular management approach, on the other hand, is based on the principle of preventing each one from establishing dominance over the other by separating the fields of thought and belief, the phenomena of politics and worship.

Understanding that democracy, which is a regime of freedoms, cannot be based on other philosophical foundations, the Turkish people have put forward a convincing test in protecting secularism since the foundation of the Republic. There does not seem to be a valid reason for him to give up this determined attitude now.

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Prof. Dr. Doğu Ergil

Source: ATATÜRK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ DERGİSİ, Sayı 17, Cilt: VI, Mart 1990