Afyon Kocatepe Time 05:30

In an interview with Fikret Otyam in 1960, Etem Tem  explained how he took the "Monument Photograph" he created in Afyon Kocatepe, what happened that morning that determined the fate of the country, and what happened in the days that followed: 

I washed a few films in a barnyard. The photos were beautiful. I immediately made four, took them the next morning. They took it in. The barber was shaving. There was a portable table, a portable bed, and two chairs in the room. At one point he pointed to the room: "Oh, well.... This is not befitting of a commander-in-chief's office," he said. Salih (Bozok) said he would decorate the room with carpets. Because that day Trikopis would be brought. Gazi took the photos and looked at them. He ran his fingers over the photos and snapped: "Very nice," he said. Salih (Bozok) said he would decorate the room with carpets. Because that day Trikopis would be brought. Gazi took the photos and looked at them. He ran his fingers over the photos and snapped: "Very nice," he said. Salih (Bozok) said he would decorate the room with carpets. Because that day Trikopis would be brought. Gazi took the photos and looked at them. He ran his fingers over the photos and snapped: "Very nice," he said.

"It was September 9... We went to Kadifekale. The time was close to sunset. The sea was sparkling... The city was underfoot... There were some ferries in the bay... The steamers were smoky... A report came. Our cavalry arrived in Izmir. had entered...."Armies, your first target is the Mediterranean, forward.." order was fulfilled. Izmir was ours again...

Izmir was burning hot... We could hardly reach the place where the photographer's shop was. But what should we see?... the shop was burned down... I had a few films left that I could wash on that ruined barn in Uşak... All the others were burned down together with the photographer's shop..."

Regarding this photograph , Falih Rıfkı Atay will say the following in his article "A 26 August Anniversary" :

" The photographic lens has never left such a vivid trace in history. "  

Source: 1- Fikret Otyam, "Etem Tem" röportajı, Ulus Gazetesi, 4 Aralık 1960, Ankara.

 2- Falih Rıfkı Atay, " Bir 26 Ağustos Yıldönümü" Milliyet Gazetesi, 26 Ağustos 1928

I - PREPARING FOR THE GREAT ATTACK

The year 1921 passed with military and political struggles and successes for Türkiye. M. Kemal Pasha, who had drawn the war strategy even during the Erzurum Congress, had only fought defensive wars, unless a decisive offensive power was reached against the Greek Army It can be discussed in two parts as the " period, as well as in terms of military strategy.

    * distraction

    * Strategy

    * General Counter-Attack , can be divided into three phases. The stalling phase lasted from May 15, 1919 to January 6, 1921. This period was also the period of national awareness, national political organization and establishment of the new state. The strategic defense phase lasted from January 6, 1921 to September 13, 1921, that is, until the end of the Sakarya Victory. In this phase, the establishment of the army, the establishment of the internal security authority, the organization of internal resources, the provision of external resources, and the making of agreements in foreign relations took place. Having successfully concluded both phases, M. Kemal Pasha came to the "General Counter-Attack" phase in the third phase of his strategy, which would lead to a definitive conclusion.

M. Kemal Pasha, who had almost never failed in his life and was brought up in wars, was a commander with superior military-political strategy intelligence and knowledge and superior intuitive and initiative skills. To prepare for a decisive "War of Extermination", the army needed time and an armed force of at least 100,000 men. Hundreds of cannons and machine guns, millions of bullets and thousands of tons for so many weapons had to be transported to the front and the army's commander and officer needs had to be met. In addition to ammunition and weapons, food, clothing, hospital, doctor, medicine were needed. After the Battle of Sakarya was won, M. Kemal Pasha gave the command to İsmet Pasha, the Commander of the Western Front, to start a general attack after ten days of preparation. But to İsmet Pasha, the army's weapons, ammunition, Logistics reported that the health services were in a very bad condition and that they were not strong enough to carry out such an attack, and this attack was postponed after the investigations made by the Commander-in-Chief. It seems that it was necessary to wait a year for the attack on the Greek Army, which had taken a defensive position and strengthened its front by bringing in new forces.

On the other hand, those who were opposed to M. Kemal Pasha in the Assembly again began to attack and to criticize the morale of the people and the army. The people, on the other hand, had given all they had during the long war years and were in a miserable condition. In order to reach the final result, the success that will destroy the enemy in the homeland, the Commander-in-Chief

    * Nation

    * Assembly

    *  To prepare the army for war and "to equip Turkey's thinking minds with an entirely new faith. To give the whole nation a solid spirituality." He knew what he needed and was working on this path. This period was quiet at the front, but behind the front, it was spent with tough struggles and preparations.

At the beginning of the National Struggle, the people were under the influence of the Sultan and the Istanbul Government and resisted in some places to avoid the authority of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The strength of the national will increased day by day. These poor people, who were devastated during the First World War1, became devoted to M. Kemal Pasha with great faith after the Sakarya Victory. He started to work by putting forth his best for the preparation of the army. Despite this, there were agitators, mischief-makers, spies, and although they were considerably less, there were cases of deserters and robberies. The execution of the orders of the parliamentary authority and the Commander-in-Chief required the continuation of the extraordinary powers in the extraordinary danger.

Independence Courts

In the face of the extraordinary danger arising from the Eskişehir-Kütahya defeats, the Independence Courts were re-established and when M. Kemal became the Commander-in-Chief on 5 August, the authority to establish the Independence Courts and appoint their members or terminate their duties was passed to him.

The Independence Tribunals worked in Kastamonu, Konya, Yozgat, Samsun and Ankara regions both during the Sakarya War and after the war. While working hard against deserters, mischief-makers, spies, robbers, etc., they ensured that Tekalif-i Milliye Emirs were fulfilled. They punished those who did not comply with these orders and did not give the requested material, and they did not hesitate to take drastic measures against state officials who forcibly took the transportation vehicles, food and animals in the hands of the people, except for the Tekalif-i Milliye Emirs. In order to prevent the violation of these orders, it was announced through the press that such criminals would be punished in the harshest way. Especially the Kastamonu and Konya Independence Courts working on the two wings of the Sakarya front. s biggest study subject was the incidents of deserters. If they did not commit crimes such as robbery, murder, rape, they were given amnesty and they were allowed to join the front. Samsun and Yozgat Independence Courts also looked at other crimes, especially the Pontus rebellion criminals. The working methods were the same as the previous Independence Courts.

Considering that the Kastamonu Independence Court alone sent 12,733 fugitives to the front between August 20 and September 20, 1921, the effectiveness of the courts on deserters can be better understood. As the deserters could be prosecuted collectively, the military branches were notified by telegraph that if there was no crime (robbery, killing, rape), they would be sent to the front by shooting ten times the number of escapes, according to the number of escapes. Thus, time, which is the most important factor of the war environment, was not wasted. Those who committed crimes were tried according to their crimes. The aim was to send as many soldiers as possible to the front and prevent them from escaping again. Despite the extraordinary powers given to them, the courts acquitted the Greeks for whom there was no evidence, while the guilty Muslim Turks were punished. Since the Independence Courts, working with a national purpose, follow the same method as before, we can determine the crimes they look at and the penalties they give as follows. Other crimes other than escape:

        * Treason, uprising

        * Espionage

        * Robbery

        * Debauchery, anti-propaganda

        * Abuse of office,

        * Murder

        * Public torture and oppression

        * Rape of military family

        * Failure to comply with Tekalif-i Milliye Emirs

        * Taking advantage of enemy occupation and engaging in illegal actions

        * Assistance and cooperation with the enemy

        * Join the enemy army

    According to the degree of crime, these crimes were punished as follows:

        * Execution by hanging and shooting. (Treason, espionage, collaboration with the enemy and joining his army, rape of a soldier's family, robbery, murder)

        * Kal'a-bend, rowing and hard imprisonment

        * Exile

        * Beating (with sticks)

        * Compensation

        * Dismissal

        * Display in front of the public and soldiers

        * Detention until the end of the National Struggle

        * Seizing, destroying and burning property and property. (It was found illegal and provoked a strong reaction.)

        * To recruit the nearest soldier instead of the deserter, to receive a heavy fine (200 lira) from his village or neighborhood. (this was found illegal and caused criticism in the Assembly.)

The courts regularly reported and informed the Commander-in-Chief about their work. Lists of executions were sent. In this way, they were monitoring the work of the Commander-in-Chief and the Parliamentary Independence Courts. The Assembly and the Commander-in-Chief did not supervise the Courts. The law gave them unlimited power. They were very effective because their decisions were implemented immediately and had no appeal. Since it was not possible to interfere in the work of the courts, control was only achieved by dismissing them.

The work of the Independence Courts was supported by the Government and M.Kemal Pasha and it was stated that it was beneficial. The Turkish Grand National Assembly had shown great accuracy and goodwill in establishing the Independence Courts and choosing their regions. The people he elected to the courts, away from any influence, tried to fulfill the high authority and jurisdiction entrusted to them by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for the protection of their great and cherished ideals and the revolution in the country, appropriately and with due diligence. The courts did not use these powers to rise above the law, but for the life and independence of the country. Most of the members of the Independence Courts, which were revolutionary courts, were young people. They also severely punished those who showed loyalty to the sultan. Kastamonu Independence Court (President Mustafa Necati Bey was 28 years old.) He tried 200 deserters in a trial he held in Bolu. Because the fugitives showed loyalty to the Sultan and shouted "Long live our Sultan," they were first sentenced to death; but the notables warned the criminals and explained the meaning of the Grand National Assembly and the National Struggle to the fugitives and said, "Down with the Sultan." When they shouted, the death penalty was abolished and they were sent to the front. These and people like them were fleeing because the Sultan abolished military service and they did not know about the national purpose of the TGNA. Thousands of fugitives surrendered and were sent to the front, with the methods of the Independence Courts, on the one hand to punish and on the other hand, to win over these people by convincing them. He tried 200 deserters. Because the fugitives showed loyalty to the Sultan and shouted "Long live our Sultan," they were first sentenced to death; but the notables warned the criminals and explained the meaning of the Grand National Assembly and the National Struggle to the fugitives and said, "Down with the Sultan." When they shouted, the death penalty was abolished and they were sent to the front. These and people like them were fleeing because the Sultan abolished military service and they did not know about the national purpose of the TGNA. Thousands of fugitives surrendered and were sent to the front, with the methods of the Independence Courts, on the one hand to punish and on the other hand, to win over these people by convincing them. He tried 200 deserters. Because the fugitives showed loyalty to the Sultan and shouted "Long live our Sultan," they were first sentenced to death; but the notables warned the criminals and explained the meaning of the Grand National Assembly and the National Struggle to the fugitives and said, "Down with the Sultan." When they shouted, the death penalty was abolished and they were sent to the front. These and people like them were fleeing because the Sultan abolished military service and they did not know about the national purpose of the TGNA. Thousands of fugitives surrendered and were sent to the front, with the methods of the Independence Courts, on the one hand to punish and on the other hand, to win over these people by convincing them. but the notables warned the criminals and explained the meaning of the Grand National Assembly and the National Struggle to the fugitives and said, "Down with the Sultan." When they shouted, the death penalty was abolished and they were sent to the front. These and people like them were fleeing because the Sultan abolished military service and they did not know about the national purpose of the TGNA. Thousands of fugitives surrendered and were sent to the front, with the methods of the Independence Courts, on the one hand to punish and on the other hand, to win over these people by convincing them. but the notables warned the criminals and explained the meaning of the Grand National Assembly and the National Struggle to the fugitives and said, "Down with the Sultan." When they shouted, the death penalty was abolished and they were sent to the front. These and people like them were fleeing because the Sultan abolished military service and they did not know about the national purpose of the TGNA. Thousands of fugitives surrendered and were sent to the front, with the methods of the Independence Courts, on the one hand to punish and on the other hand, to win over these people by convincing them.

Independence Courts have had great benefits. In 1922, the authority of the Assembly was fully established. The army was established and security and peace came and there was no need for the Independence Courts, so they were dismissed in July 1922. On 31 July 1922, they took a new form with the "Independence Law No. 249". With this law, the appointment of a prosecutor was accepted. The Law on Fugitives and its annexes were repealed. After the Great Offensive and the liberation of Izmir, the motions demanding the establishment of Independence Tribunals in "Liberated Areas" were not accepted. However, an Independence Court was sent to Amasya and Elcezire. The work of the Independence Courts in the National Struggle is shown in the chart above.

State of the Parliament

Although the enemy was defeated in Sakarya and M. Kemal Pasha achieved great success, the opposition wing in the Assembly began to criticize heavily. Rauf Bey, who returned from exile from Malta, had joined the Government as "Anafia Deputy". Rauf and Refet Bey's resignation from the government further encouraged the opposition in the Assembly. Refet Bey was criticizing the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of General Staff for sitting far from the front in Ankara and claiming that the army's affairs were not going well for this reason. M. Kemal Pasha stated that the affairs are best managed from Ankara, which is why Ankara was chosen as the center. But the mood in the Assembly became even tougher. This development led to the separation of the conservative and reactionary wing from the radical wing, namely the Defense of Rights group (Group I), and the Second World War. It led to them forming a separate group with the group name. Rauf Bey also encouraged this group. After that, the criticism of Group II intensified even more. "Where are we going? Who is driving us, and where? Into the unknown. Would a whole nation drift idly towards obscure dark goals?" "Why don't we attack? Our army is rotting where it stands." His criticisms sparked controversy. Those who claimed that the army must attack after the Battle of Sakarya attributed the army's failure to attack to its lack of offensive power. Some even suggested attacking the British Army in Iraq, not the Greek Army. M. Kemal Pasha, in the face of these criticisms, stated that the decision of the army was to attack, but an attack made with half-measures would give bad results, He said that the army was expected to be adequately prepared. The interesting thing is that those who made these criticisms were initially (during the Sivas Congress) of the opinion that the Turkish Nation could not achieve its independence on its own, and insisted on asking for a foreign mandate. For this reason, M. Kemal Pasha said in the Assembly, "Masters, material and especially moral depression begins with fear ... incapacity. Helpless and cowardly people cause the nation to hesitate and become timid in the face of any disaster. in hesitation they go so far as to humiliate themselves. They say that we are not and cannot be men. We cannot be men of ourselves. We should leave our existence unconditionally to a foreigner. These criticisms and the claims that the army did not work had reached such dimensions that they could collapse the domestic front. "Shall we accept the Treaty of Sevres, whatever we do, whatever we can save, let's get out of this." His words had a devastating effect on morale. Although this criticism in the parliament emerged at every opportunity, M. Kemal Pasha faithfully continued the offensive preparations of the army. These criticisms and the claims that the army did not work had reached such dimensions that they could collapse the domestic front. "Shall we accept the Treaty of Sevres, whatever we do, whatever we can save, let's get out of this." His words had a devastating effect on morale. Although this criticism in the parliament emerged at every opportunity, M. Kemal Pasha faithfully continued the offensive preparations of the army.

Peace Proposal (Deception) of the Allies

At the beginning of 1922, as the goodwill representative of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Kemal Bey, would meet with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Istanbul, İzzet Pasha. Yusuf Kemal Bey suggested to the Istanbul Government to walk together towards the same goal and cooperate. However, İzzet Pasha kept himself busy in Istanbul, and Izzet Pasha went to Paris and London before Yusuf Kemal Bey, passing through the places in the hands of the Greeks. Yusuf Kemal Bey, who went to London in February 1922, met with Lord Curzon. As understood from these talks, the Entente Powers will soon propose peace to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. However, the Entente Powers first stipulated a ceasefire between Türkiye and Greece. However, Türkiye He wanted Anatolia to be evacuated first. As Curzon persisted in his decision, no results could be obtained.

While Yusuf Kemal Bey was continuing his work abroad, Commander-in-Chief M. Kemal Pasha stated in his speech to the Assembly on March 1, 1922 that the nation and the army got used to the harsh living conditions and all kinds of difficulties in the three years that passed in the national war, and that he did not give up on the struggle. addressed economic and social issues. He declared that the owner and true master of Turkey was peasants, and therefore the economic policy of the GNAT government would be aimed at this goal. He explained that one of the important aims of the government's economic policy is to nationalize the economic institutions and enterprises that are directly related to the general interest with sufficient financial and technical power. The principles of foreign policy also include "Strengthening our friendship ties with the Russian Republic of Shura is the basis of our foreign policy. This principle,

This speech of M. Kemal Pasha in the Assembly while Yusuf Kemal Bey was abroad showed on what basis he would accept peace, if the principle of full independence was rejected, the war would continue and relations with the Soviet Union would continue.

Before Yusuf Kemal Bey returned to Turkey, the Allies offered a ceasefire to Turkey and Greece on 22 March 1922. England wanted to stall Turkey and to provide the most profitable peace in favor of Greece. Britain was concerned in three respects.

    * Türkiye could soon launch a successful attack against the Greek Army. (In this case, the new peace terms would be realized as Turkey wanted.)

    * How far will Turkey's friendship with Russia develop?

    * The possibility of a military operation by Turkey against Iraq (Mosul was within the borders of the National Pact and Turkey had a significant number of soldiers on the Alcezire Front).

Because of these concerns, England sent a ceasefire note dated March 22, as it wanted a ceasefire before the peace talks between Turkey and Greece began. According to the note of the Allies:

    * 10 km between the two sides. An empty corridor will be left without soldiers at the width and neither side will reinforce their forces.

    * The hostilities between the parties will be stopped for three months and the ceasefire can be extended until the terms of peace are determined.

The insincerity of the ceasefire was clearly seen in the second article. The monitoring of the Turkish and Greek Armies was to be carried out by the observers of the Entente Powers, their friends and enemies of the Turks, who brought the Greeks to Anatolia.

M. Kemal Pasha, who was at the front at the time of the ceasefire proposal of the Entente States, summoned the Council of Ministers to Akhisar and while the response was being prepared, the peace proposal of the Entente States dated March 26 came. According to these terms of peace:

    * In İzmir and Thrace, Tekirdağ will be given to Turkey; Edirne, Kırklareli, Babaeski will stay in Greece.

    * An Armenian homeland will be established in the East.

    * Military service will not be compulsory in Turkey, but the army will be increased from 55,000 to 85,000.

    * Some of the financial, economic and judicial provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres will be amended in favor of Turkey. In addition, after the treaty was made, the Allied Powers would leave Istanbul.

Although the GNAT government accepted this proposal in principle, in the counter proposal it sent on April 5, 1922, it demanded that the Greek Army withdraw from the Eskişehir-Kütahya-Afyon line within the first fifteen days after the signing of the armistice, and from all Anatolia, including İzmir, within four months. The Allies rejected Turkey's request on April 15th. Thus, the peace attack or deception initiated by the Allies was inconclusive. M. Kemal announced to the Parliament and the nation on 4 March that a real and just peace would not be won through the Allies, but only with a decisive Turkish victory.

Commander-in-Chief Incident (M. Kemal Does Not Relinquish Commander-in-Chief)

With the law dated 5 August 1921, M. Kemal Pasha was given extraordinary powers as the Commander-in-Chief. Since these powers were granted for three months, they were extended a second time on October 31, 1921, and a third time on February 4, 1922, due to extraordinary danger. Each time, the criticism of the opponents increased. The peace proposal and rejection of the Entente States mobilized the opponents of M. Kemal Pasha. Claims that the opportunity for peace was missed and that the nation was dragged into adventure began again. On May 4, 1922, the fourth extension of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief was discussed in the Assembly. In this meeting, in which M. Kemal Pasha was not present, 72 members demanded the abolition of the powers, and only 114 positive votes were received in the voting, and no result could be obtained because there was no majority. m. In this case, Kemal Pasha asked the opinion of the notables of the army (especially Kazım Karabekir). Because at that moment the army was left without a head. The Government and the Chief of General Staff wanted to resign in this sad situation. There was weakness in the management of the country. M. Kemal Pasha, determined not to leave him as the Commander-in-Chief for the interests of the country and national purpose, stated the importance and seriousness of the situation in the Assembly in a secret session on 6 May. Upon this claim of Salih Bey (Erzurum), who claimed that the powers of the Assembly were taken by force, he expressed his belief and respect for the Assembly and legitimacy. It was M. Kemal Pasha who prepared the establishment of the Assembly by risking his whole life, existence and honor. Despite all kinds of pressure and accusations, he did not object to the existence of the Assembly. Supreme commander' He stated that they can make an investigation whenever they want to those who claim that their income sources were not examined because of the existence of the company. To those who see the power of the army as proportional to money: "We have money, we make an army; your money is gone, let the army disperse... I have no such problem with that. Gentlemen, there is money or not. Whether it is or not, there is and will be an army. " gave the answer. This is how the Turkish Army was established and the Battles of İnönü and Sakarya were won. Those who criticized the Tekalif-i Milliye Emirleri, published by the Commander-in-Chief, claimed that the Commander-in-Chief burdened the nation with drudgery and forced them to do work. After M. Kemal Pasha reminded that this method was used in the face of the extraordinary danger, he said, "If the army's shortcomings necessitate doing work by force for free to the nation, we do it and this is the most correct law. He said that the applause of Vasıf Bey, who claimed that the army would not be able to move, was sad and embarrassing. Afterwards, he announced that he wanted to resign from the command immediately according to the votes in the Assembly, and even informed the Government that his position as the Commander-in-Chief had ended, but that he did not and would not relinquish his position as the Commander-in-Chief in order not to cause an unavoidable collapse and not to leave the army without a head in the face of the enemy. After this announcement, the extension of the term of the Commander-in-Chief was accepted with 177 positive votes. He said that the applause of Vasıf Bey, who claimed that the army would not be able to move, was sad and embarrassing. Afterwards, he announced that he wanted to resign from the command immediately according to the votes in the Assembly, and even informed the Government that his position as the Commander-in-Chief had ended, but that he did not and would not relinquish his position as the Commander-in-Chief in order not to cause an unavoidable collapse and not to leave the army without a head in the face of the enemy. After this announcement, the extension of the term of the Commander-in-Chief was accepted with 177 positive votes. but he declared that he did not and would not relinquish his position as the Commander-in-Chief in order not to cause an unavoidable collapse and not to leave the army without a head in the face of the enemy. After this announcement, the extension of the term of the Commander-in-Chief was accepted with 177 positive votes. but he declared that he did not and would not relinquish his position as the Commander-in-Chief in order not to cause an unavoidable collapse and not to leave the army without a head in the face of the enemy. After this announcement, the extension of the term of the Commander-in-Chief was accepted with 177 positive votes.

But the opposition within the Assembly did not stop. With a law passed in July, it was ensured that the Ministers and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers were directly elected by secret ballot in the Assembly. Thus, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was removed from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the nomination of ministerial candidates by the Speaker of the Assembly was also abolished. The opposition group then elected Rauf Bey as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister). The oppositional situation within the Assembly before the Great Offensive was thus prevented from further development.

Source: Ergün AYBARS, History of the Republic of Turkey 1, Ege Un. Press, 1986, Pages: 310-319  

II - GREAT ATTACK (26 August 1922)

Greek Side

After the Battle of Sakarya, the Greeks formed a strong defense line on the Eskişehir-Afyon line. A British Staff Officer who saw these fronts said, "If the Turks occupy these positions in four or five months, they can claim that they silenced them in a day." he said. Having strengthened this front so much, the Greeks, on the other hand, occupied Söke and Kuşadası (21 and 30 April 1922) evacuated by the Italians. With this behavior, they showed that they were determined to stay in Anatolia. They were forming troops by recruiting the Greeks of the Aegean region. They bombarded Samsun on 7 June 1922 to intimidate Turkey, to raise the morale of the Greek people, and to avenge their ship named "Enosis", which was captured by Turkish warships. On June 5, Lloyd George's head of the Greek Army" reported to use force if necessary. Contrary to Lloyd George's policy, British General Harrington helped the French and sent troops to the Çatalca line. When Italy took the same energetic stance, the Greeks gave up on these attempts.

While Greece continued this policy and preparations, the morale of its army and Greek people was very bad. The announcement of heavy defeats and losses in Sakarya had a very bad effect. The Greek soldier began to think that he was fighting in vain in Anatolia. The army had lost its training and discipline in the Royalist and Venizelist conflict. In addition to the political and military collapse, the economic depression had also reached a high level and the doors of foreign aid were closed. Nor did they heed the warnings of foreign statesmen and military observers that the Greeks should leave Anatolia. They did not want to miss the historic opportunity they had to realize Greater Greece. They were convinced that their armies were strong enough.

Turkish Side

After the Battle of Sakarya, an attack was requested before the Greek Army had a chance to prepare, but it was abandoned because the army was not ready for it. Later, the attack was postponed due to the onset of rains, but preparations were made as if an attack would be made at any moment. Since mobilization was declared in September 1921, the army's need for soldiers was largely met. In the Battle of Sakarya, there were no more escapes due to the lack of food, clothing and ammunition. While the supplies, weapons and ammunition needed by the army were provided in various ways, training and discipline were brought to a perfect level. A chain of command was established within the army. Security measures were also taken behind the front. The command staff of the army consisted of experienced commanders who had been trained during the long war years. With the newly recruited soldiers, the number of the army reached 200,000. Food, clothing and ammunition were brought to a sufficient level. Considering the possibility of several pitched battles, preparations were made accordingly. The Turkish Army was waiting for the attack order of the Commander-in-Chief to save the homeland.

Forces of the Parties

Parties Officer Private Rifle Light Mk. Rifle Heavy Mk. Rifle Cannon Sword

Turkish Army 8.659 199.283 100.352 2.025 839 323 5.282

Greek Army 6,565 218,432 90,000 3,139 1,280 418 1,280

Despite all the difficulties, the Turkish Army was able to come close to the Greek Army in terms of materials and weapons. The Commander-in-Chief had already prepared the offensive plans as of January 1922. He frequently went to the front and watched the preparations closely.

Offensive Decision

Mustafa Kemal Pasha came to Alaşehir on 27 July 1922. He made the final changes on the attack plan with the Chief of Staff and the Front Commander, and according to the final form of the plan, it was decided to complete all the preparations by August 15 and in the meeting dated July 30, to launch the attack on August 26.

However, Mustafa Kemal Pasha saw fit to apply to the Entente Powers one more time for the peaceful resolution of the Turkish problem. Fethi (Okyar) Minister of the Interior, representing the GNAT Government, was sent to Europe in July with full authority. Fethi Bey, who met with Poincare on July 23, told reporters, "We can win the victory. But we are afraid of shedding blood." said. England, on the other hand, refused to meet with Fethi Bey at the ministerial level. When all of Fethi Bey's peaceful attempts were rejected by England, who thought Turkey to be weak and interpreted this attempt as the result of this weakness, Fethi Bey wrote in the report he sent to the Government after 14 August, "The achievement of our national goals will only be possible through military activities." He stated that the peace initiatives were unsuccessful. He left Ankara on the night of 17/18 August and went to Konya to watch Mustafa Kemal Pasha's preparations for the attack. There were only a few people who knew that he had left Ankara. It was even announced that a ball was held in Çankaya on August 21. However, M. Kemal Pasha was in Akşehir on 20 August. M. Kemal, Pasha, who had the post office confiscated in Konya, prevented it from being announced that he was in Konya. On 20 August, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Western Front Commander to launch an offensive on 26 August. The Commander-in-Chief, who explained the situation on the map to all the commanders at the commanders meeting held the same night, repeated the attack order. or gone. There were only a few people who knew that he had left Ankara. It was even announced that a ball was held in Çankaya on August 21. However, M. Kemal Pasha was in Akşehir on 20 August. M. Kemal, Pasha, who had the post office confiscated in Konya, prevented it from being announced that he was in Konya. On 20 August, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Western Front Commander to launch an offensive on 26 August. The Commander-in-Chief, who explained the situation on the map to all the commanders at the commanders meeting held the same night, repeated the attack order. or gone. There were only a few people who knew that he had left Ankara. It was even announced that a ball was held in Çankaya on August 21. However, M. Kemal Pasha was in Akşehir on 20 August. M. Kemal, Pasha, who had the post office confiscated in Konya, prevented it from being announced that he was in Konya. On 20 August, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Western Front Commander to launch an offensive on 26 August. The Commander-in-Chief, who explained the situation on the map to all the commanders at the commanders meeting held the same night, repeated the attack order. On 20 August, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Western Front Commander to launch an offensive on 26 August. The Commander-in-Chief, who explained the situation on the map to all the commanders at the commanders meeting held the same night, repeated the attack order. On 20 August, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Western Front Commander to launch an offensive on 26 August. The Commander-in-Chief, who explained the situation on the map to all the commanders at the commanders meeting held the same night, repeated the attack order.

The Turkish Army had a force close to the enemy. However, in order to be able to attack, it was necessary to be two or three times superior to the enemy. For this reason, some forces from Eskişehir were brought to Afyon, which was chosen as the place of attack, with a night march. In this way, while superiority was gained against the enemy forces in the Afyon region, the forces on the Eskişehir front were weakened. For this reason, some army commanders, even though they found the attack inconvenient, carried out the Commander-in-Chief's order. Eskişehir region, I. and II. İnönü became a battleground because of the Eskişehir-Kütahya and Sakarya Wars, its resources were exhausted, and its people were in great distress. However, the Afyon region was not a war zone. Behind the front was the product of the Konya Plain. The enemy did not expect an attack from Afyon. The Commander-in-Chief also reported the decision of the attack to the Council of Ministers. On the night of 25-26 August, the Turkish army made all its preparations and approached the enemy front. During the offensive, the public was asked for help to transport the ammunition and material needed by the army. The women, whose men were at the front, came with hundreds of oxcarts. In fact, some oxcarts had cows because oxen could not be found.

The basis of the Turkish offensive plan was to defeat the enemy in a single blow and to destroy the enemy armed forces in a way that would not allow them to establish a new front behind. It was not possible for the ammunition, which had been provided with great difficulty, to be sufficient for a long war.

The attack began when Turkish artillery opened fire at 04:30 on the morning of 26 August. The Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Front Commander were watching the attack from Kocatepe. On August 26, several important hills belonging to the enemy were captured. From 27 August, the enemy began to retreat. Turkish forces gained the upper hand. As the Greek army retreated, it began to set fire to the surrounding area. In these two days, 4-5 divisions of the Greeks were defeated. In order not to allow the strong units of the Greeks on the Eskişehir front to establish a defensive front, the cavalry units hung back and blocked the Dumlupınar road. The 5 divisions of the surrounded Greek Army were heavily defeated and surrendered at the end of a war led by the Commander-in-Chief himself. The survivors of the Greek forces began to flee towards Izmir in panic. İsmet Pasha named this field battle, which resulted in the destruction of the enemy forces in Dumlupınar on 30 August, the "Battle of the Commander-in-Chief" on 31 August. M. Kemal called this war "Greek Sındık".

After the field battle, M. Kemal Pasha, who toured the area, was very touched after seeing the heavy defeat of the enemy, the weapons, ammunition and war material left on the battlefield, their dead, and the return of many prisoners in convoys, and said to his companions, "This scene is shameful for humanity. But we We are defending our homeland here. The responsibility is not ours." he said.

On 31 August the main forces of the enemy were destroyed or captured. His forces in the Eskişehir region were also preparing to withdraw. However, the Greek Army, which could combine the forces they would bring from Kocaeli and Thrace with the forces withdrawn from Eskişehir, could establish a new defense line in the east of İzmir. In order to prevent this situation, the Commander-in-Chief informed the armies that the Greek Army should be followed without mercy until Izmir, and that they would attack wherever they were caught, and said, "Armies, your first target is the Mediterranean, forward!" gave his order. At the request of the Commander-in-Chief, Fevzi Pasha was promoted to Marshal and İsmet Pasha to Ferik. Other commanders were also promoted to a higher rank. The Turkish Army started a relentless pursuit operation. The Greek Army flees, abandoning its weapons, ammunition and supplies, While fleeing, he was burning and destroying everything, leaving a great deal of debris behind. The seized material and captives were reaching large numbers. It was impossible for the Greek Army, which gave thousands of dead and prisoners, to gather itself. The soldiers had reached Izmir as soon as possible and entered the race to get on the ship and save his life. The Greek Army and the local Greeks were fleeing towards Izmir, fearing that the Turkish Army would take revenge because the Greek Army had made a great massacre while retreating.

The pursuit operation, which started on 31 August, resulted in the entry of the killed Turkish women and children into Izmir on September 9, through the burning Turkish cities and towns, with the great and tireless determination created on the Turkish soldier. Despite the fact that the Greek Army had committed such great cruelty in Anatolia, the captured Greek Generals were hosted and consoled by the Turkish Commander-in-Chief.

While the Greek forces, deteriorated on the Afyon side, fled towards İzmir, the forces in the Eskişehir region surrendered to the forces of the Turkish Army, which surrounded them from the Kocaeli region. Some of them were taken in the direction of Bandırma. Western Anatolian cities began to be liberated one after another. These cities, which were burned by the Greek Army, in turn welcomed the Turkish Army. Alaşehir, Buldan, Kula, Söğüt on 4 September, Bilecik, Bozüyük, Simav, Demirci, Ödemiş, Salihli on 5 September, Akhisar, Balıkesir on 6 September, Aydın on 7 September, Kemalpaşa and Manisa on 8 September. either Turkish Army entered. Izmir was liberated on September 9 and Bursa was liberated on September 10.

The Greek soldier who could reach the sea was trying to throw himself to the islands with the vehicle he could find. Bandırma and İzmir region Greek soldiers and local Greek caravans were not passed. The fear of the Turks coming scared even the Greeks living on the islands and made them forget that there was a sea in between. The city of Izmir had an apocalyptic appearance, consisting of a large crowd of people, Greek Soldiers and local Greeks who wanted to throw themselves on ships and save their lives. This crowd, who wanted to board the Allied (especially the British) ships in the port, were not allowed on the ships. The British, who had brought the Greek Army to Izmir, were now leaving them to their fate. Local Greek boatmen are from their own kin,

Mustafa Kemal Pasha arrived in Belkahve on September 9, but as the clashes continued in İzmir, he spent the night in Kemalpaşa and entered İzmir on September 10. Even on September 10, fighting was still going on in places, and a Greek force of 3,000 people was taken prisoner. A mansion was prepared in Karşıyaka for M. Kemal Pasha, who had entered Izmir, to stay. King Constantine also stayed in this mansion. Those who greeted him at the door of the house had spread a Greek Flag on the stairs. To those who stated that the Greek King had entered the house by trampling on the Turkish Flag, M. Kemal replied, "He made a mistake. I cannot repeat this mistake. The flag is the honor of his nation. he lifted it.

While the great victory was greeted with enthusiasm all over the country, congratulatory telegrams began to arrive from foreign Muslim countries. Among the first to congratulate was the Ambassador of the Soviet Union Aralov. While Aralov was liberating Turkey, which was fighting against "Western Imperialism", Muslim countries were celebrating the success achieved against the Crusaders. The consuls and admirals of France, England, Italy, and the USA in Izmir also congratulated the Army Commander on 10 September. But it was clear that they were worried. Because with this war, not only the Greeks were defeated, but the world order established by the Allies (Lloyd George, Wilson, Clemenceau, Orlando) was also destroyed. While the New York Times described the Greek defeat as the greatest disaster to befall humanity and civilization, The British press was horrified at the event, and the French press was asking Turkey whether a new war would be waged. While the headlines of the newspaper were "Turkish Victory" and "Turks are in Izmir", it was focused on how the Turkish Army of 250,000 people crushed the Greeks, and the loss of people, weapons and ammunition of the Greeks. "Le Temps Newspaper" gave a realistic interpretation of the disastrous result of King Constantine's adventurous policy, that the Turks, who destroyed two Greek armies in a lightning war and dumped their remains into the sea, had solved the "Asia Minor Problem" in fifteen days. It was focused on how the Greeks crushed the Greeks, and the Greeks' loss of people, weapons and ammunition. "Le Temps Newspaper" gave a realistic interpretation of the disastrous result of King Constantine's adventurous policy, that the Turks, who destroyed two Greek armies in a lightning war and dumped their remains into the sea, had solved the "Asia Minor Problem" in fifteen days. It was focused on how the Greeks crushed the Greeks, and the Greeks' loss of people, weapons and ammunition. "Le Temps Newspaper" gave a realistic interpretation of the disastrous result of King Constantine's adventurous policy, that the Turks, who destroyed two Greek armies in a lightning war and dumped their remains into the sea, had solved the "Asia Minor Problem" in fifteen days.

A few days after the Turkish Army entered İzmir, on 13 September, a fire broke out in some parts of the city. In particular, the sound of gunfire from Armenian houses and the outbreak of a great fire, led to the spread of rumors that the fire was started by "Armenian and Greek Organizations" and that they received help from the British Consul. European merchants, whose houses were burned, claimed that the fire was started by Armenians. Although the American, British, French and Italian Consuls asked the Greek Minister of War to guarantee that Izmir would not be burned on September 6, this guarantee was not given. It is very interesting that the Greeks, who burned all of Western Anatolia, claimed that the Turks burned Izmir. It was the Turks who suffered the most from the burning of the city. The "Beautiful Izmir" they saved was on fire. The most upset M. He became Kemal Pasha. The fire lasted for three days and most of the city was destroyed. Now a city in ruins was left in the hands of Turkey. Just like other cities, towns and villages of Western Anatolia.

Victory's Result

The "Great Victory", which resulted in the destruction of the Greek Army within fifteen days, meant that the Commander-in-Chief, taking great risk, made a strong center of gravity, ensured the attack in the attack, chose the exact place in the war against the enemy with equal strength, having the superiority of fire. It was won by his superior success in making decisions, managing domestic and foreign policy well, fusing the nation and the army and preparing them for war. The Turkish Army destroyed the Greek Front, which was thought to be indivisible in 4-5 months, in a few days. 500-600 km in 15 days. took the road. He destroyed an enemy army of 150,000 men. This great success ensured national unity and confidence at home. The determination of the Turkish Nation, which was thought to be dead, destroyed this thought. It was a great source of power in terms of preparing the signing of the Mudanya Armistice Agreement and the Lausanne Treaty. The foundation of the Turkish Republic, which is a fully independent Turkish State, and the power source of the Turkish Revolution was again this victory. The Entente Powers, who thought that they could solve the "Eastern Problem" as they wished, accepted the power of Turkey and that the Eastern Question was closed in Lausanne. As Atatürk said, victories are important in terms of their aims and results. There have been many great battles in history. But most of them have not produced equally great results. The Battle of the Commander-in-Chief not only swept the enemy armies into the sea and saved the country, but also prepared the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. They accepted the power of the Ottoman Empire and the closing of the Eastern Question in Lausanne. As Atatürk said, victories are important in terms of their aims and results. There have been many great battles in history. But most of them have not produced equally great results. The Battle of the Commander-in-Chief not only swept the enemy armies into the sea and saved the country, but also prepared the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. They accepted the power of the Ottoman Empire and the closing of the Eastern Question in Lausanne. As Atatürk said, victories are important in terms of their aims and results. There have been many great battles in history. But most of them have not produced equally great results. The Battle of the Commander-in-Chief not only swept the enemy armies into the sea and saved the country, but also prepared the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.

Source: Ergün AYBARS, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi 1, Ege Ün. Basımevi, 1986, Sayfa: 334-341